The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated Markets by Wallace, Wanda
W&M ScholarWorks 
Open Education Resources (OER) 
1980 
The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated Markets 
Wanda Wallace 
College of William & Mary, wanda.wallace@mason.wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/oer 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wallace, Wanda, "The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated Markets" (1980). Open Education 
Resources (OER). 2. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/oer/2 
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Open Education Resources (OER) by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, 
please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
This.teachfngtool has been developed through the support 
of the Touche Ross & Co. Aid to Education Program 
The 
cono ic ol 
of the Audit in 
Free and egulated 
ark t 
By Wanda A. Wallace, Ph.D., CPA,CMA 
Graduate School of Management 
University of Rochester 
This teaching tool has been developed through the support 
of the Touche Ross & Co. Aid to Education Program. The 
object of the project is to promote the wide dissemination 
and use of the teaching tool in conjunction with any auditing 
text currently in use at both the undergraduate and gradu-
ate level. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce this 
teaching instrument for use in courses of instruction, so long 
as the source and supporter are indicated in any such repro-
ductions. This teaching supplement is believed to fill a void 
in the available instruction materials for auditing. It serves as 
a link between the economics and finance training of the 
students and the detailed study of auditing by describing 
auditing as an economic service. 
1980 
Preface 
This teaching tool relies heavily on the 
references listed at the end of each section. 
The text could be liberally footnoted, but 
such referencing would inhibit readability. 
Instead, key points in the text are numerically 
coded to one of the listed references that 
discusses the issue and will, in turn, direct 
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I. 
Introduction 
Before studying the details of auditing, a 
clarification of the role of the audit in both the 
free market and a regulated environment is 
important. Understanding the role of auditing 
is facilitated by prior courses in economics 
and finance. Your understanding of these 
tools will serve as a basis for describing au-
diting as an economic service. Recent devel-
opments in agency theory and information 
theory and well-known financial/economic 
concepts will be explained and applied to 
provide a theoretical framework for viewing 
the audit function. An important facet of your 
study of auditing is to understand the prod-
uct. By clarifying the incentives of the parties 
involved in the decision to have and to supply 
an audit, as well as the attributes of the audit, 
you will be able to understand the role of the 
audit. As you go into practice or other 
business positions, education, or govern-
ment, you will have an analytical base which 
will prove to be useful in 
1. explaining audit services, 
2. marketing audit services, 
3. deciding to contract for audits, and 
4. resolving political and regulatory issues 
related to audits. 
The text first summarizes the observed 
demand for and supply of auditing services in 
unregulated environments. The framework for 
evaluating determinants of demand is then 
presented as a set of alternative hypotheses 
(tentative solutions to the problem of un-
derstanding and predicting the demand for 
audits). 
Existing auditing literature discusses the 
role of hypotheses in furthering theory 
development.1 Hypotheses attempt to ab-
stract essential features of reality that are 
useful in predicting what is or what.would be 
under a specified set of conditions. By defi-
nition, hypotheses are not realistic descrip-
tions of the numerous details which might 
affect a phenomenon of interest. Instead, 
hypotheses are simplistic positive or objective 
statements, typically in IF/THEN form (given 
certain conditions, then these events can be 
expected to occur). The degree to which IF 
conditions accurately describe reality is 
unimportant, given that the resulting predic-
tions are reasonably accurate. 2 For example, 
it is unimportant that the theoretical phrase 
"given a perfectly divisible commodity" in 
economics does not describe any real com-
modity; the assumption merely suggests what 
influences are being ignored in forming 
predictions. Further, if experience differs 
from predictions, it is possible that such dif-
ferences stem from an attempted application 
of a hypothesis with this condition to an 
almost indivisible commodity. In other words, 
an attempt to apply a theory in a domain 
where it is known an assumption is wrong (as 
distinct from merely simplified) is likely to 
give wrong answers.3 
The hypotheses that describe the demand 
for audits have underlying assumptions which 
may not correspond to reality or to your per-
ception of the nature of man. Such a lack of 
correspondence is not the appropriate cri-
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terion for selecting among alternative hy-
potheses. Instead, the degree to which the 
predictions of hypotheses are consistent with 
available evidence on auditing practices is the 
appropriate criterion for tentatively accepting 
a hypothesis as valid or for rejecting a hy-
pothesis. The reader, aware of the IF/THEN 
form of a hypothesis and its tentative, evolv-
ing nature as a basis for explaining and 
predicting events, can select between the hy-
potheses presented or formulate some alter-
native, perhaps hybrid, theory describing the 
market for auditing services. The intention of 
this instrument is to introduce the alternative 
hypotheses present in the literature which 
appear to be consistent with available 
evidence on the demand for audits under 
varying conditions. The hypotheses represent 
the most reasonable explanations available in 
existing literature that account for observed 
auditing practices. 
The hypotheses presented extend key 
concepts ingrained in the traditional auditing 
literature, as exemplified by the list of four 
conditions that create a demand for auditing 
provided by the Committee on Basic Auditing 
Concepts in 1973:4 
1. Conflict of Interest-conflict between 
an information preparer and a user can 
result in biased information production 
2. Consequence-information can have 
substantial economic consequences to 
a decision maker 
3. Complexity-expertise is often required 
for information preparation and 
verification 
4. Remoteness-users are frequently 
prevented from directly assessing the 
quality of information. 
The astute reader will recognize these con-
ditions in each of the hypotheses outlined. 
In addition to describing the three key 
hypotheses that explain and predict the 
observed demand for auditing services, the 
by-products of an audit, which .may be 
influential in determining whether a party 
contracts for an audit, are described. To 
formally support the basic concepts which 
underlie the hypotheses presented, a brief 
introduction to information economics is 
provided. 
The supply of audits is described in very 
general terms, since the nature of the audit 
production function will be studied in depth 
throughout the auditing course. The purpose 
of this text is to provide a framework to eval-
uate the implications of observed audit 
practices and the effects of changes in the 
production function. 
Finally, the effect of regulation on the 
demand for and supply of audits is consid-
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ered, with analogies drawn to the effect of 
more general economic regulation. Now, 
inductive reasoning will be applied to ob-
served auditing practices to infer the demand 
for auditing services in the absence of regula-
tion. 
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II. 
The Market 
Evidence 
In microeconomics, or price theory, you 
studied the allocation of scarce resources to 
satisfy competing demands. You acquired 
knowledge of the price system of a free-
enterprise exchange economy which deter-
mines 
1. what is produced, 
2. how it is produced, and 
3. how it is distributed. 
You learned that the desire of individuals for 
more preferred situations causes market 
exchanges which shift property rights to the 
highest valued use, thereby guiding produc-
tive resources toward an efficient allocation 
of their services. Thus, the presence or 
absence of output of a given commodity is 
the consequence of market forces that reflect 
the valuation of the good by consumers.1 
You are aware that auditing services are 
currently provided to a large number of 
business and government units. This ob-
served production alone suggests that 
auditing services are valued by consumers. If 
they were not, the resources currently ex-
pended for audits would be shifted toward 
competing, preferred products. However, 
those of you familiar with the Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC), an agency that 
regulates the United States (U.S.) securities 
markets, are probably aware that preparation 
and "certification" of financial statements are 
required by the Securities Act of 1934. Based 
on this regulatory fact, some people often 
assert that auditing exists solely because of 
regulation. However, the political process is 
not the only explanation for the apparent 
demand for auditing. One can observe the 
free market prior to SEC requirements. Also, 
unregulated segments of the economy today 
which are voluntarily audited provide evi-
dence that the audit is valued apart from reg-
ulatory compliance concerns. The additional 
question of whether regulation is in the public 
interest, reflecting the valuation of goods by 
consumers, will be answered differently by 
each of you depending on your perception of 
how political decisions are made. 
A. Pre-SEC 
The securities acts were not passed until 
1933 and 1934, yet in 1926, according to 
Moody's Manuals, 82 percent of the firms 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) were already audited by CPAs. 2 That 
percentage had increased to 94 percent 
before the commencement of hearings on the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The NYSE 
in conjunction with the American Institute of 
Accountants [now the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AI CPA)] 
developed reporting and auditing guidelines 
from 1930 to 1932 and required audited 
financial statements in 1933 prior to the 
Securities Exchange Acts. The American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) had similar dis-
closure rules. The exchange rules prior to 
government legislation suggest the member 
companies valued the audit requirement.3 
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Evidence of substantial market demand for 
audits is also available in the years prior to 
the NYSE requirements. In the 1880s and 
1890s U.S. companies were voluntarily con-
tracting for audits. By 1882 the supply of 
accountants was sufficient to lead to the 
organization of the first society of account-
ants in this country. By 1886 the American 
Association of Public Accountants (pred-
ecessor to the AICPA) was formed. That 
organization's early attempts to set education 
and examination standards for admission4 
resulted in August 1896 in the first certified 
public accountants law in New York State. By 
1899, 183 public accountants practiced in 
New York City and 71 practiced in Chicago, 
all primarily involved in performing audits. 5 
B. Pre-U.S. 
If the scope of market evidence is extend-
ed beyond the U.S., audits can be identified 
as early as 500 to 300 B.C. in the Greek city-
state of Athens. State revenues and expend-
itures were verified by three boards of state 
accountants.6 Later, auditing developed in 
Italy as a means of verifying the accountabili-
ty of the sailing-ship captains returning to 
Europe from the Old World with riches. In 
1394, the city of Pisa underwent an audit, 
similar in kind to that applied in ancient 
Greece. From 1500 to 1850 auditing was 
expanded in scope to include the early 
manufacturing activities of the Industrial 
Revolution.7 In 1844, the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) required audits through regulation, 
albeit by stockholders, with or without the 
assistance of outside auditors. Yet, rather 
than creating a new reporting requirement, 
the law simply formalized the common 
practice of voluntary company audits. 8 While 
it cannot be denied that the law caused audits 
in companies which previously did not have 
them, the 1844 law was not responsible for 
creating the demand for audit services by 
corporations; it only marginally increased the 
demand for audits by increasing the cost of 
not having an audit. 
C. Non-SEC 
Because the Securities Act requirement 
for an outside audit has not been lifted since 
its imposition, it is difficult to collect evidence 
regarding the persistence of audits in the 
absence of regulation. However, audits are 
not uncommon in segments of the economy 
that are not subject to the SEC. For example, 
the municipal sector is not subject to the SEC 
requirements, yet auditing of municipalities 
by outside parties is typical. While many 
states mandate audits, evidence exists that 
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most local units in Missouri, Georgia, and 
South Carolina-three states with no such 
legislation-voluntarily contract for audits 
with independent public accountants.9 Similar 
evidence of widespread voluntary audits is 
provided by the fact that 80 percent of the 
corporate audit clients of Price Waterhouse & 
Co. are not registered with the SEC. Price 
Waterhouse & Co. is one of the "Big Eight" 
(the largest international public accounting 
firms, which together audit 92 percent of the 
companies listed on the NYSE and 76 percent 
of those on the AMEX). 10 
D. Synopsis 
The persistence of audits through time in 
unregulated environments provides evidence 
of the valuation of auditing services in excess 
of their perceived costs by consumers. 
However, the critical question for an under-
standing of the audit function is why have 
audits been requested, i.e., what character-
istics of the product are valued? Users of 
audits of SEC companies are likely to differ 
from the users of audits of small corporations 
and municipalities, resulting in different 
valuations of the product attributes of an 
audit. However, the three alternative (or 
complementary) hypotheses to explain the 
existence of auditing, discussed in the fol-
lowing sections, are believed to encompass 
the varying concerns of such diverse user 
groups. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. Increasingly complex and extensive 
reporting requirements have made the 
securities statutes the accountants' fuli 
employment acts. Do you agree? 
2. If the SEC requirement for auditors' 
certification of public companies' financial 
statements was eliminated, would the ob-
served frequency of audits decline sub-
stantially? 
3. The simple existence of continued de-
mand for auditors, assuming consumers 
are rational self-interest maximizers, 
suggests the audit has value. Critically 
comment on this claim. 
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Ill. 
Agency Theory: 
The Stewardship 
{Monitoring) Hypothesis 
"The origin of auditing goes back to times 
scarcely less remote than that of accounting. 
... Whenever the advance of civilization 
brought about the necessity of one man be-
ing entrusted to some extent with the prop-
erty of another the advisability of some kind 
of check upon the fidelity of the former would 
become apparent.''1 
The "stewardship" function of the audit 
that is implied in the above quote has recently 
been formally analyzed as an agency prob-
lem. An agency relationship is a contract 
under which one or more principals engage 
another person as their steward (agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf, the 
performance of which requires the delegation 
of some decision making authority to the 
steward. The money-handlers for the state 
were agents of the people of the ancient state 
of Greece, the ship captains to Europe were 
agents of the investors in ships, and manag-
ers have always been the agents of company 
shareholders. Audits have been commonly 
observed in each of these settings. 
A. The Agency Relationship 
If both parties to the agency relationship 
are assumed to attempt to maximize their 
self-interests and if the monitoring of perfor-
mance is not costless, then good reason 
exists to believe that the agent will not always 
act in the best interests of the principal. The 
self-interest of each individual depends on his 
utility function and wealth position, which are 
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unlikely to be identical for any given principal 
and agent. However, a principal can obtain 
some protection by adjusting the price paid 
for agents' services. 
For example, if an owner expects a 
manager to overspend on non-pecuniary 
benefits such as a plush office for himself, the 
owner will attempt to negotiate a reduced 
wage to offset this expected overspending. 
Similarly, if the self-interests of an agent are 
maximized through charitable activities (due 
to a personal utility function that values 
giving rather than self-indulgent perquisites), 
the principal will reduce the agent's wages to 
offset the amount of expenditures to charity 
from the principal's resources that exceed the 
level of expenditures desired by the principal. 
A manager, anticipating that the wage reduc-
tion could be greater than the value to him of 
the plush office or the pleasure received from 
charitable activities, will have an incentive to 
contract to not overspend on either a plush 
office or charities, or to write contracts in 
which he has incentives to not consume such 
non-pecuniary benefits. If no such arrange-
ment was possible, the manager would 
probably leave his position to locate a more 
palatable arrangement with other principals. 
In other words, to preserve his compensation 
the manager will be willing to expend 
resources up to the amount by which the 
wage adjustment exceeds the value of non-
pecuniary benefits, in order to guarantee that 
he will not take certain actions which would 
harm the principal or to ensure that the 
principal will be compensated if the agent 
(manager) does take such actions. 
Since the principal's expenditures for 
monitoring (expenditures to control the 
agent's behavior, including costs of measur-
ing and observing the agent's behavior) are 
reflected in reductions of the wages paid to 
the manager, the manager's interest is served 
by seeing that the monitoring is performed at 
the lowest cost. For example, suppose the 
manager collects financial statement informa-
tion for internal decision making purposes. 
He would be better off paying the cost of 
providing financial statements to the prin-
cipals and having the accuracy of those 
statements attested to by an independent 
outside auditor, rather than incurring the 
larger cost of having each principal collect 
such information individually and adjust the 
price paid to the agent accordingly.2 The 
profit figure and resource allocation 
decisions of the agents implicit in the 
financial statements provide useful perfor-
mance measures. Operational audits (that 
focus on managers' efficiency and effec-
tiveness) and auditors' special engagements 
to search for fraud are alternative means of 
assessing managements' performance and 
the degree to which agents' actions differ 
from the principals' preferences. 
B. Rational Expectations 
An important concept that underlies an 
analysis of why audited financial statements 
will be demanded is the relatively new eco-
nomic theory of "rational expectations." This 
economic concept assumes that people take 
into account all available information that 
influences the outcome of their decisions, 
that they utilize this information intelligently, 
and therefore that they do not systematically 
make mistakes. The term "systematically" 
means that since people will learn from past 
mistakes and experience, on average they 
cannot be consistently fooled; in other words, 
principals will not be consistently "ripped off" 
by agents. . 
The implication of rational expectations 
theory for agents is that principals will: (1) 
expect agents' self-interests to diverge from 
the principals' interests, (2) be able to 
estimate the effect of such divergence, and 
(3) adjust prices (wages offered) to reflect the 
related costs of the agents' expected ac-
tivities. The ability of principals to protect 
themselves through a downward adjustment 
of prices causes the agent to generate 
demand for monitoring activities. Hence, the 
agent rather than the principal is the source 
of demand for monitoring activities, siilce 
principals are basically indifferent due to their 
ability to protect themselves from the risk of 
loss perceived in an agency relationship by 
merely paying less for the agent's services. 
This adjustment capability causes agents to 
demand monitoring as a means of avoiding 
the downward adjustment of their wages. Of 
course, whenever the principals' price adjust-
ment exceeds the costs of monitoring an 
agent, all parties could share the savings 
realized from contracting for audits or from 
using similar means to reveal the agent's 
performance.3 
C. The Stewardship (Monitoring) 
Hypothesis 
While the means of monitoring a steward 
can take a variety of forms-owner-manager 
involvement, contingent compensation con-
tracts, periodic reports on performance, 
etc.-the means of primary interest for 
continuous performance reporting is a set of 
a company's financial statements. Substantial 
evidence exists that earnings announcements 
by companies often result in stock price ad-
justments,4 that accounting information is 
related to the market value of a corporation's 
shares,5 and that accounting ratios can be 
used to estimate the probability of bankrupt-
cy6 and the risk of owning a company's 
stock.l These facts suggest that reported 
earnings have information content8 and are 
useful in the assessment of an agent's per-
formance. The use of accounting information 
in management compensation and bond 
indenture contracts9 demonstrates the use of 
reported earnings in performance evaluation. 
From the discussion of agency theory and the 
implications of rational expectations, incen-
tives clearly exist for agents to provide 
financial statements to facilitate monitoring 
activities by principals. However, if the prin-
cipals do not trust the numbers provided by 
an agent they will insist on compensation 
(through adjustment of the agent's wage) for 
the risk of loss they perceive. Hence, in 
addition to providing financial reports, the 
steward will agree to provide evidence that 
the reported numbers are carefully prepared 
to avoid accidental error and are free of 
material fraud. The product which provides 
this assurance, with acknowledged limitations 
with respect to fraud discovery, is the 
independent audit. 
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While the discussion has focused on the 
relationship between owner and manager, as 
principal and agent, it is not difficult to draw 
analogies to the stewardship relationship 
between 
1. employer and employee, 
2. creditors and shareholders, 
3. different levels of management in firms 
and agencies, 
4. government and taxpayers, 10 and 
5. all parties to cooperative efforts in all 
organizations. 
In other words, the stewardship (monitoring) 
hypothesis states that when one party is 
delegated decision making power, he has an 
incentive to agree to be checked if the 
benefits from such monitoring activities ex-
ceed the related costs. As one imagines the 
potential extraction of resources possible in 
the absence of monitoring, e.g., the stealing 
and reselling of assets by managers, one can 
understand that outside ownership would not 
be observed if control mechanisms were un-
available. (The price adjustment demanded to 
compensate for such undesirable and ex-
pected actions would generate a zero wage 
for the agent's services.) Yet, ownership by 
numerous outside stockholders and invest-
ments by outside creditors are common, as 
are audits, implying that control mechanisms 
are available to facilitate an acceptable wage 
level for owner-managers and for managers 
holding no ownership shares. Further, the 
growth in audits of U.S. companies from 1885 
to 1900 coincided with a substantial expan-
sion in the number of firms with publicly 
traded securities and the number of corporate 
mergers and consolidations, 11 suggesting that 
audits are valued control mechanisms that 
facilitate outside investment. In fact, evidence 
shows that the likelihood of a firm voluntarily 
hiring an auditor increases with (1) the ratio 
of total debt to total assets, presumably to 
address the steward relationship of manage-
ment to creditors, and (2) the total number of 
employees, presumably to address the 
steward relationship of lower management to 
higher management.12 The implication of this 
evidence is that the monitoring capability of 
an audit is one characteristic valued by 
stockholders, creditors, and top management. 
Although agency theory focuses on the 
expectation that principals' self-interests will 
differ from those of agents, it does not imply 
that agents are always expected to be evil. In 
fact, as already suggested, agents may be 
good in the context of being charitable, and 
yet not perform in line with the wishes of their 
principals. It cannot be denied that a prob-
ability of misbehavior-in the sense that 
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managers' actions will not always maximize 
their principals' interests-exists, and that 
means of lowering this probability are of 
economic value. These means can be termed 
monitoring activities and necessarily include 
the audit as one possible means of preventing 
or detecting such misbehavior. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. a. Provide an example of how an employer 
could find an external auditor useful in 
monitoring employees. 
b. If the employer chose not to hire an 
external auditor, who would bear the 
employer/employee agency cost of this 
decision? 
c. Would it be the wrong decision not to 
hire an external auditor? 
2. An owner-manager says, "If the banker 
wants a set of audited financial state-
ments, he'll have to pay for the audit." 
Comment on the owner-manager's under-
standing of agency theory. 
3. Monitoring contracts will be written 
(1) when the agent has incentives to take 
actions which will diverge from those 
actions preferred by principals, and 
(2) when the cost to the party taking the 
actions (in terms of price or wages) 
exceeds the benefits of such divergent 
actions. 
a. What is then suggested by the com-
monality of monitoring contracts and 
of audits specifically? 
b. Cite agency settings in which audits are 
not observed and explain the likely 
reason why such monitoring contracts 
are not utilized. 
4. Give some examples of monitoring con-
tracts tied to audited accounting numbers. 
5. a. What are the differences in market set-
ting in the political and private market? 
(Focus on the costs of transacting in 
both markets.) 
b. What are the implications of these 
differences in market setting for the 
demand for audit services by private 
business and government agencies (or 
state and local governmental units)? 
c. Why would politicians contract for an 
audit? 
(See reference 10 for a formal discussion of 
related issues.) 
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IV. 
The Information 
Hypothesis 
An alternative (or complement) to the 
stewardship hypothesis is the information 
hypothesis. It is argued that investors de-
mand audited financial statements because 
they provide information that is useful in their 
investment decisions. The common invest-
ment decision models in the finance literature 
value a firm by computing the present value 
of future net cash flows, which have been ob-
served to be highly correlated with financial 
statement information. The audit is valued as 
a means of improving the quality of the 
financial information. 
The information hypothesis appears to 
overlap the monitoring hypothesis. 
Presumably some of the same information 
that is useful in monitoring contracts is also 
useful to the investor in making investment 
decisions. Note, however, that the monitoring 
hypothesis would predict explicit contracting 
with principals to provide audited financial 
statements for monitoring over the life of the 
contract as part of the agent control mech-
anism. This commitment to provide audited 
information would be made when the agency 
relationship is initiated. In contrast, the 
information hypothesis emphasizes that 
financial information is needed to determine 
market values, which are means of making 
rational investment decisions, even in the 
absence of the ability to explicitly contract 
with the agent. 
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A. The Benefits of Information 
The literature in finance, economics, and 
accounting discusses three major sources of 
benefits from information: 
1. reduction of risk, 
2. improvement of decision making, and 
3. earnings of trading profits. 1 
Audited financial statements can be related to 
each benefit. 
Presuming investors tend to be risk-
averse, by definition they will demand a 
higher return for higher levels of risk, or al-
ternatively they will pay a higher price in the 
form of a risk premium to reduce the level of 
uncertainty or risk of an investment. Assume 
for purposes of this analysis that the risk 
premium represents the individual's assess-
ment of how much an audit will decrease the 
uncertainty concerning reported financial 
information. If the risk premiums of each 
investor in a firm were added together and 
the sum exceeded the cost to the firm of an 
audit, then all parties would be better off if 
uncertainty was lowered by issuing audited 
financial statements. 
Some investors could lower their risk 
exposure to an individual firm by forming a 
portfolio of audited and unaudited investment 
opportunities, thereby decreasing the risk 
premium available to offset any sing~e entity's 
audit cost. However, the systematic uncer-
tainty as to the quality of unaudited financial 
information would increase the variability of 
the market as a whole, demanding an undi-
versifiable market risk premium against which 
the cost of auditing could be balanced. In 
addition, barriers to diversification can exist 
which result in larger risk premiums to 
compensate for the unsystematic risk of 
unaudited data (peculiarities of a particular 
firm's unaudited data apart from its relation to 
the market as a whole). The audit can reduce 
both market-related (systematic) and firm-
specific (unsystematic) risk.2 
An audit is also valued as a means of 
improving the financial data utilized by 
managers in decision models. An auditor can 
improve input data either by finding errors or 
by making employees more careful in prepar-
ing records in anticipation of an audit. More 
accurate data for capital budgeting, inventory 
planning, and break-even analysis (as a basis 
for production and pricing decisions) will 
improve internal decision making. The im-
plication of the numerous decision models 
which utilize financial information is that 
audited information could be demanded for 
management decision making alone. External 
use of more accurate data for credit and 
investment analysis, labor negotiations, or 
regulation decisions will likewise improve 
managers' performance. 
The third use of information cited refers to 
gains from trade by investors with private 
access to new information. To evaluate 
properly the possibility of audits yielding 
gains from trade you need to recall the 
concept of rational expectations described in 
Section Ill. B. 
One implication of the assumption of 
rational behavior is market efficiency, i.e., 
asset prices reflect all available relevant 
information. Observed behavior over time and 
extensive testing of stock markets, com-
modities markets, and foreign-exchange 
markets provide empirical support for the 
rational expectations theory. Since asset 
prices impound each investor's judgments, 
which reflect all publicly available informa-
tion, there is no way another investor can 
utilize such publicly available information to 
earn a return in excess of the normal 
expected return. The numerous studies which 
have searched for a trading rule that 
systematically earns returns in excess of the 
normal expected return by utilizing public 
information have repeatedly supported 
market efficiency. The individuals who are 
first to discover new information relevant to 
the current valuation of a corporation's 
securities can trade on that information and 
increase their wealth. They will trade until the 
price of the corporation's securities adjusts to 
the equilibrium price, or expected return, of 
the securities, given the information. How-
ever, once this information is impounded 
in the price as a result of these trading 
activities, other investors cannot be rewarded 
for using the same information.3 This is why 
the information benefit of profits from trading 
is only realized by investors with private 
access to new information. The market is so 
efficient that it adjusts to new information 
almost instantaneously, implying that unless 
an investor is purchasing or selling stock at 
the very minute a public announcement of 
information is made, no abnormal returns will 
be realized. 
With this background, the audit function 
can be evaluated with respect to the benefit 
of trading gains. The commonly observed 
practice in situations of public ownership is 
for management to contract for an audit and 
·make the audited financial statements public-
ly available; this practice was observed prior 
to the securities acts. Private corporations 
typically contract with the auditor and make 
the audit results available to owners and 
creditors. The likelihood of managers or any 
other party earning excess returns will 
depend on the ability to maintain private 
access to the audited data. Although the 
manager will likely be the first party aware of 
the audit results, managers have interests 
similar to those of auditors, who are preclud-
ed from trading on the information due to 
concerns for professional independence. 
Managers are concerned with how their 
trading gains at the expense of their prin-
cipals might affect the value of their human 
capital as agents. In fact, in the presence of 
regulation, managers are typically precluded 
from trading on such "inside information." 
Further, at public announcement of the audit 
results, the price of the securities will adjust 
to the information so quickly that no third 
party is likely to systematically earn abnormal 
gains from trade. 
As a matter of fact, no price adjustment 
may result from the audit itself: the findings 
could be discovered by outsiders at an earlier 
date, or the audit results could be replaced by 
surrogate information available prior to the 
audit. In other words, the announced audit 
findings may do little other than confirm 
investors' expectations and existing market 
valuations. However, the relative absence of 
gains from trade on audit results does not 
imply a lack of value for audited information. 
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B. Information Value 
The distinction between information value 
and the ability to gain from trade is important. 
For example, empirical evidence exists that 
unpublished financial results by business 
segments (lines-of-business or sub-entities), 
as opposed to consolidated financial 
statistics, if made available to an investor 
would lead to improved forecasting and 
better trading rules. 4 Similarly, if information 
on audited earnings per share5 and similar 
financial results are obtained before the 
market gains the knowledge, excess returns 
can be earned. In other words, information 
available to an individual and not yet public 
indeed leads to above normal trading gains, 
suggesting such information has value. 
However, the efficient markets evidence 
demonstrates that no above normal trading 
returns would be expected once the informa-
tion is publicly available and prices have 
adjusted to their expected equilibrium levels. 
In spite of the inability to earn abnormal 
returns from publicly available information, 
evidence exists that public information 
releases have value to individual investors 
since such releases generally cause updating 
of beliefs and clarification of some unre-
solved uncertainty which may lead to in-
creased trading. Through trading, individuals 
can shift to a preferred portfolio investment 
position, thereby increasing their utility (well-
offness). Each individual has a utility function 
that reflects his tastes with respect to the 
desired risk and return relationship in the 
optimal investment portfolio. In finance 
theory the optimal portfolio is at the point of 
tangency (where two lines meet) between an 
indifference curve (or utility curve) and the 
efficient set of investments (or the boundary 
of the opportunity set). The efficient set or 
boundary of the opportunity set includes all 
feasible combinations of investments not 
dominated by some other combination of 
investments; the boundary merely reflects 
different risk/return relationships. The in-
dividual can utilize information to adjust his 
portfolio investments to a position of greater 
utility, whether or not the particular piece of 
information resulted in a stock price adjust-
ment. (In other words, the second benefit 
described in Section IV. A. holds in the 
absence of the third benefit.) 
An example of the role of audited data is 
provided by research results which demon-
strate an improvement in the estimation of 
risk through the use of accounting informa-
tion.6 While this "better estimate" of risk and 
expected return does not mean that one 
could earn an abnormal rate of return in the 
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market, it does suggest that an individual can 
reevaluate his investments and shift toward 
more preferred investment combinations. For 
example, an investor approaching retirement 
may prefer a portfolio with a market risk 
lower than average, and if he finds he is 
holding a riskier asset than he personally 
desires based on the "better estimate" of risk 
he can benefit from that information. Similar~ 
ly, a corporation may prefer dividend-paying 
corporate investments due to the fact that 85 
percent of corporate dividends are not 
subject to corporate income tax. Information 
on expected returns and their relation to 
dividend policy, while unlikely to lead to 
gains from trade, can increase the individual's 
total utility. 
The inference which can be drawn from 
the portfolio investment activities of in-
dividuals is that while the audit could be 
neutral in the sense of not changing the 
expectations of the market as a whole, it 
could greatly alter the expectations of in-
dividuals concerning risk and return. Hence 
the audit can improve investment decisions 
by an individual. 
C. The Public Good Argument 
Analysts and regulators claim that since 
audited financial statements are available to 
nonstockholders at no cost, the value to them 
for portfolio rebalancing (shifting to a 
preferred investment position based on im-
proved estimates of risk and return) is not 
considered by companies when deciding 
whether to provide audited information. The 
nonstockholders are referred to as free-riders 
since they benefit from the information with-
out paying for it. However, analysts and 
regulators argue that everyone is harmed by 
the underproduction of information that 
results from information producers, such as 
managers, not explicitly considering the value 
of financial data to nonpurchasers. Recogni-
tion of the portfolio rebalancing benefits of 
financial information which can be unaccom-
panied by stock price adjustment has led, in 
turn, to a claim that regulation in the form of 
mandatory information disclosures is re-
quired to curb the underproduction of infor-
mation. This demand for regulation which 
arises from the information hypothesis will be 
briefly analyzed before turning to the third 
hypothesis explaining the demand for audit 
services. 
Free-riders are considered to be an acute 
problem in assessing the demand for infor-
mation because of (1) discovery problems 
(detection of information content is frequent-
ly possible by simply observing the actions of 
some party who is in possession of the infor-
mation) and (2) the inability to effectively 
exclude nonpurchasers from having access to 
informatiofl once it becomes available 
through unauthorized resale by purchasers. 
Moreover, there is a theoretical basis for 
opposing the exclusion of any information 
user from access to financial statistics once 
they are produced: audited financial state-
ments have public good attributes. (A public 
good exists whenever one person's consump-
tion of a good does not reduce another 
person's consumption. It is often described in 
economics by providing the example of 
national defense as a public good.) Since the 
use of information by one individual to 
rebalance his portfolio does not diminish the 
value of that same information to other users 
for rearranging their portfolios, efficiency 
would seem to dictate that no user who 
values the information should be excluded 
from access to audited financial statements. 
However, if nonpurchasing users are not 
excluded from access to financial statements, 
the number of free-riders will increase. 
Managers may underproduce audited finan-
cial data based on the purchasers' demands, 
relative to the level of production which 
would reflect the total demand for audited 
information by users. Yet, the total demand 
for audited financial statements, if the de-
mand of all free-riders was measurable, can 
be only a slight increase, if any, over the total 
production of audited financial statements 
observed in the absence of regulatory in-
tervention. The pre-1934 market evidence 
(before enactment of the securities laws) 
suggests that audited data were widely 
produced without regulation. Since financial 
statements are either audited or unaudited in 
the presence of generally accepted account-
ing and auditing standards, and purchasers' 
valuations obviously are sufficient to motivate 
companies to be audited, the marginal effect 
of free-riders' additional demand is unlikely to 
have a substantive effect on auditing prac-
tices. 
Not only is it questionable how much 
underproduction actually results from free-
rider/public good aspects of information, it is 
also an erroneous claim that regulation is 
required to reach the desired level of informa-
tion production (both the quantity of informa-
tion available and the breadth of its distribu-
tion). Alternative means of increasing the 
amount of information produced do exist, 
such as using a market mechanism to reach 
the target output. In other words, just as a 
group of regulators can set a desired level of 
i~formation production by mandating specific 
disclosures, based on available information 
about the demand for a product by non-
stockholders, a private coalition, such as a 
firm,.can assess this demand and increase the 
level of disclosure by slightly altering the 
structure of property rights through contract.:. 
ing.7 One means of assessing demand 
through contracting is to set a price for the 
information made available to nonstock-
holders. Frequently, regulators claim that this 
approach is impractical since it is difficult to 
exclude nonpurchasers and therefore difficult 
to arrive at the appropriate price which will 
encourage the increased information produc-
tion. Nonstockholders will claim no value for 
the information resulting in a low or zero 
price if they can acquire the information 
without payment. 
Having difficulties with nonpurchasers is 
not synonymous with being unable to ex-
clude such parties. With effective exclusions 
through contracting, enforcement activities, 
and appropriate pricing, all users that value 
the information will presumably purchase it, 
and the free-rider and waste problems 
potentially related to public goods will be 
solved. Private contracting as a means for 
effective exclusion would be possible, 
although costly to enforce. Sources of 
information to nonstockholders, including 
libraries, could be charged for audited data at 
a price which presumably reflects the value of 
the information to users of the data. Un-
authorized resale of the data could be 
prohibited. Due to imperfections in contract-
ing and enforcement techniques, some users 
of audited financial data could remain free-
riders, not having their valuation of financial 
data reflected in the information production 
decision. However, the total effect of these 
free-riders on the supply of information must 
be compared with the cost of perfect or 
extended contracting and enforcement ac-
tivities; the market mechanism has failed only 
if the benefits from increased information 
production exceed such costs. 
The extent to which a market mechanism 
failure justifies intervention by regulators will, 
in turn, depend on the cost of regulation 
relative to the combined cost of private 
contracting, enforcement, and lowered infor-
mation production attributable to free-riders. 
Since intervention by regulators will involve 
an estimate of nonpurchasers' information 
(without the added information available from 
private contracting with prices set to reflect 
each individual user's valuation of the infor-
mation), it is not obvious that the resulting 
level of information production will be 
preferred to the level of production in private 
markets.8 
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D. Synopsis 
The information hypothesis predicts a 
demand for audited information as a means 
of reducing the risk of investments, improving 
internal and external decision making, 
enhancing gains from trade, and improving 
the portfolio investment position of in-
dividuals. Although this hypothesis has been 
used to justify mandatory disclosure policies, 
it is not obvious that a cost-benefit com-
parison of available private market 
mechanisms and regulation would recom-
mend government intervention. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. Compare and contrast the information 
hypothesis and the stewardship (monitor-
ing) hypothesis as possible explanations 
of the demand for auditing. 
2. Would the public good characteristics of 
information influence the demand for 
audits generated from existing agency 
relationships? If so, how? 
3. a. If asset prices impound each investor's 
judgments, which reflect all publicly 
available information, why would an 
investor expend resources to produce 
other information? 
b. "The best estimate of an asset's value is 
today's price." Comment on the validity 
of this statement. . 
4. "If stock prices are not affected by the 
public release of information, that infor-
mation lacks value." Critically evaluate 
this statement. 
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v. 
The Insurance 
Hypothesis 
In addition to the monitoring and informa-
tion rationales for audit demand, a third and 
recently popular explanation of how 
managers choose whether or not to have an 
audit relates to management's liability ex-
posure.1 Under the securities acts, the auditor 
and auditee are jointly and severally liable to 
third parties for losses attributable to defec-
tive financial statements. Under common law, 
the auditor is generally liable to only iden-
tifiable third parties. The details of auditors' 
professional liability are beyond the scope of 
this text. (An in-depth discussion of liability 
under common law and the securities acts is 
readily available in existing auditing text-
books.) However, the breadth of auditors' 
legal responsibilities is substantial, as is the 
number of cases litigated since the mid-
1960s. Investment bankers, trustees, under-
writers, lawyers, and managers who have 
professional liability exposure for their par-
ticipation in financial activities involving 
disclosure practices have incentives to insure 
themselves via auditors' participation. The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 specifically 
provides the defense of "expert reliance"2 to 
any party being prosecuted. The ability to 
shift financial responsibility for reported data 
to an auditor lowers the expected loss from 
litigation or related settlements to managers, 
creditors, and other professionals involved in 
the securities market. As potential litigation 
awards increase, this "insurance" demand for 
an audit from managers and professional 
participants in financial activities can be 
expected to grow. 
The question arises as to why managers 
and other professionals would look to the 
auditors for insurance, rather than or in 
addition to an insurance company. At least 
four possibilities exist. First, the auditor's 
involvement may be so ingrained in a society 
that a professional who does not require an 
auditor's participation may be unable to 
substantiate that he exercised adequate pro-
fessional care. The absence of the good faith 
gesture of independent attestation may be 
more likely to imply negligence or fraud on 
the part of managers or other professionals. 
Second, accounting firms have begun to 
hire in-house general counsels, to develop 
full legal staffs for defending against pro-
fessional liability suits, and even to market 
the legal services developed for the account-
ing firm's use. Accountants' specialization in 
disclosure problems and the recently 
reported successes of their legal branches in 
deterring the filing of cases and even gaining 
remedies against the SEC suggest that the 
auditor may provide more efficient insurance 
coverage as a codefendant than an insurance 
company could provide as a third party. 
Third, the auditor facing a litigation suit is 
concerned about his reputation as well as the 
dollars he might lose in a settlement. Similar-
ly, managers value their reputation and the 
company's reputation as a well-run firm 
which distributes reliable information to the 
market. While an insurance company will 
make a cost-benefit choice of legal defense 
versus settlement out of court based on 
monetary loss, the common interests of the 
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auditor and manager (or some other profes-
sional) will insure the proper consideration of 
the effect of litigation on the reputations of 
the parties involved. 
Fourth, the managers of a firm represent 
the stockholders, trustees represent creditors, 
and, in general, professionals represent 
potential claimants in the event of financial 
loss from business failure, misleading dis-
closures, or an investment's overall poor 
performance. Auditors have "deep pockets" 
relative to a bankrupt or ailing corporation 
that cannot pay. Based on courts' in-
clinations, auditors can provide protection 
from an otherwise uninsurable business risk 
of investment. The courts have tended to 
assume that the auditor is the guarantor of 
the accuracy of financial statements to 
consumers (investors) who are deserving of 
protection from financial loss. The courts 
appear to view the auditor as a means of 
socializing risk. In other words, because he is 
held responsible for business failures, the 
auditor in turn shifts this cost to clients 
through higher fees and then to society 
through higher prices and lower returns on 
investment. Risks otherwise faced by in-
vestors are borne by society. 
The astute reader may recognize this 
socializing process to be analogous to the 
typical diversification argument that supports 
the decision to purchase insurance. An 
insurance company, by insuring a large 
number of clients, can diversify its risk and 
pass on the savings to its customers and 
investors. But why is the auditor necessary as 
a means of spreading risk? First, evidence 
exists that insurance companies do not 
adequately diversify professional liability 
risks and frequently charge back court losses 
directly, through insurance premiums, to 
those companies and/or professionals under 
coverage. While there is a one-time option to 
change insurance firms to prevent the subse-
quent recovery of litigation losses by an 
insurance company, it is unlikely that a party 
could continue to obtain liability insurance 
coverage at a reasonable price if this practice 
of terminating a policy immediately after a 
claim was known to insurance market par-
ticipants. The typical diversification advan-
tage of acquiring insurance company 
coverage appears relatively minor with 
respect to liability suits concerning financial 
statement disclosures. Second, insurance for 
protection from bad business decisions is 
generally unavailable. The complement to 
typical insurance company policies of protec-
tion via auditors' involvement can offer a 
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socialization of investment risks that are 
otherwise uninsurable.3 
A. Overlapping Hypotheses 
Of course, the insurance hypothesis 
overlaps with the monitoring and information 
rationales for audit demand. Presumably 
monitoring costs include a means of settling 
up for divergent actions of an agent, and the 
auditors' "deep pockets" (ability to pay) pro-
vide one means of settlement. Since auditors 
can be liable for the full amount of losses that 
investors may have incurred upon buying 
(under the SEC Acts of 1933 and 1934) or 
selling (under the SEC Act of 1934) 
securities,4 the auditors have a stake in fi-
nancial statement reliability. Investors, know-
ing the auditors' responsibilities, can be 
expected to perceive audited financial 
statements as having more reliability than 
unaudited data, and value these inputs to 
investment decision models, including port-
folio rebalancing decisions. 
Of course, one could argue that alternative 
means of monitoring and sources of informa-
tion exist to fulfill the monitoring and infor-
mation hypotheses. But only an auditor (1) 
can fulfill the expectation that professional 
due care involves independent attestation, (2) 
can provide the specialized knowledge of 
disclosure problems and related defense 
approaches developed by in-house general 
counsels, (3) can be expected to share 
the common interest in the effect of disclo-
sure-related litigation on reputation, and (4) 
can insure against business risk in a manner 
that socializes risk. The auditor's insurance-
related capabilities imply a separable demand 
by managers and other participants in finan-
cial markets for auditing, which stems from 
the professional liability exposure of auditors. 
B. Political Insurance 
Another dimension of the insurance 
hypothesis relates to the incentives of 
politicians to require audits. When the SEC 
was established, the government could have 
become the target for criticism whenever a 
fraud was discovered in the securities market 
or a large corporation failed financially. 
Instead, the SEC prescribed audits by in-
dependent public accountants and extended 
the auditor's professional responsibilities. 
The claim was made that "adequate disclos-
ures" would preclude a future stock market 
crash similar to the 1929 disaster. Yet, no 
support was provided for the claim that 
inadequate disclosure practices, even in part, 
caused the crash. In fact, the claim is suspect 
because, as shown earlier, voluntary disclos-
ures in the form of audited financial 
statements prior to regulation paralleled 
subsequent reporting requirements. However, 
the SEC was an overt government reaction 
which could be claimed to be the solution to 
a clear "disaster." This solution would have 
little cost to the government sector if the SEC 
could shift responsibility for future, politically 
costly events to the private sector. Through 
the years the auditors have served as a 
convenient scapegoat whenever a Penn 
Central, Equity Funding, or similar financial 
failure and fraud has occurred. Instead of 
asking "why wasn't the SEC aware of the 
situation," the focus has become "why didn't 
the auditor discover and disclose the 
problems?"s 
Audit failures do occur, and SEC reliance 
on private auditors is most likely the preferred 
means of assuring adequate disclosure. 
However, in spite of these facts, an added 
insurance benefit to politicians accrues from 
the current method of regulation. Political 
benefits are derived from mandating audits, 
increasing liability exposure of auditors to 
provide greater remedies to individual in-
vestors who lose money in the market, and 
focusing attention on audit failures which 
place auditors in the defendant's chair. 
Government regulators and politicians can 
insure themselves against blame by requiring 
that SEC companies be audited by public 
accounting firms. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. The American Law Institute's (All) 
proposed Federal Securities Code would 
limit damages on non-fraud actions to the 
greater of $100,000 or one percent of the 
defendant's gross revenues per defendant, 
to a maximum of $1,000,000. 
a. What would such a limitation on litiga-
tion damages from an auditor imply 
about the demand for an audit accord-
ing to the insurance hypothesis? 
b. What would the limitation on litigation 
damages from an auditee imply about 
the demand for an audit according to 
the insurance hypothesis? 
2. Despite the SEC's statutory authority to 
prescribe accounting principles and audit 
procedures, in general the private sector 
has been permitted to set generally 
accepted accounting and auditing stan-
dards. 
Apply the insurance hypothesis to explain 
this action by the SEC. 
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VI. 
Product Attributes 
of the Audit 
Regardless of the primary rationale for 
the audit, several product attributes are 
automatically obtained, all of which will 
influence the total number of audits and 
related services that are demanded.1 The 
attributes may be considered joint products 
or by-products of the audit. Some of the by-
products require further processing, but each 
of the attributes shares joint costs with the 
audit permitting the auditor to provide the 
complementary service at lower marginal 
costs than would be incurred if the service 
was performed by someone other than the 
entity's auditor.2 How the benefit from the 
lowered marginal cost is (or should be) 
distributed between the auditor and the client 
is a question for future research. However, 
regardless of the distribution, the cost 
savings benefit society and can be expected 
to result in a higher level of demand for 
auditors' services. 
A. Control Attributes 
The control dimension of the audit was the 
focus under the stewardship hypothesis, but 
is part of the auditor's product even when the 
information or insurance hypothesis is the 
primary motivation for contracting with an 
auditor. The audit itself acts as a deterrent to 
fraud and reporting abuses. The threat of 
discovery will presumably provide an incen-
tive for the employee not to extract resources 
illegally from an employer. Similarly, this 
threat deters managers from redistributing 
24 
the stockholders' claims to the creditors, or 
vice versa. While managers may not be prone 
to illegal acts, what they deem "minor 
abuses" could continue without detection if 
not discouraged by an independent party's 
check on reporting practices. 
One such abuse might be the "smoothing" 
of income,3 or the understating of income in 
good years and the overstating of income in 
bad years to smooth performance measures 
over time. In the popular literature this 
practice has been termed "window-dressing" 
by managers. The efficient markets evidence 
implies that stockholders and creditors can-
not be systematically fooled by such prac-
tices, so why would managers bother to 
smooth income? At least two real effects of 
smoothing, regardless of stock price effects, 
provide an incentive for managers to 
"window-dress." The first relates to incentive 
compensation practices. Bonus payments are 
typically tied to some income number, with a 
floor and a ceiling applied through a percent-
age formula. By smoothing incomes to lie 
between the floor (for example, five percent 
of the average consolidated capital invest-
ment of the firm) and the ceiling (for example, 
10 percent of the amount by which the net 
consolidated earnings as attested by the 
independent accountant exceed the floor), 
managers can maximize their bonus 
payments. The second real effect relates to 
restrictive bond covenants. Through 
smoothing activities, managers can have 
short-term relief from constraints imposed by 
covenants tied to accounting numbers. These 
incentives to smooth income can lead to the 
distortion of both performance measures and 
the information content of financial state- . 
ments. However, if managers know the 
financial statements are to be subjected to an 
independent review by an auditor, the incen-
tives to smooth can be offset by the fear of 
discovery by an auditor. 
In addition to the control dimension of the 
audit which deters fraud and reporting 
abuses due to fear of discovery, an additional 
control attribute of the audit relates to the 
improvement of internal control over 
operations. As controls over resource flow 
improve, the probability of loss from error or 
fraud declines. Similarly, carelessness in 
performing one's assigned duties is less likely 
to occur or pass unnoticed when one knows 
that an external auditor will test whether 
these duties were properly performed and will 
report on any substantial deviations. Current-
ly an auditor has a choice whether or not to 
test internal controls. But the controls must at 
least be reviewed, and it is uncommon for the 
auditor to do no testing of them. Further, a 
separate report on internal accounting con-
trols based on audit tests (or based on an 
extended engagement to review controls) can 
be issued, itemizing weaknesses in controls 
and recommending improvements. 
Even in the absence of a separate report 
on internal accounting control, the auditor 
typically recommends means of improving 
existing internal controls through verbal 
communication or through a management 
letter. In addition, an auditor frequently 
suggests ways of increasing the efficiency of 
operations, such as changing the physical 
lay-out of a plant to simplify the transfer of 
goods-in-process, adopting inventory control 
models (Economic Order Quantity or EOQ) 
and other sophisticated decision approaches, 
and constructing cost systems, budgets, and 
performance evaluation measures that 
motivate personnel. Recommendations on 
improving internal accounting control and 
productive efficiency are side benefits of an 
audit which can result in cost savings in 
operations, lower costs for property and 
bonding insurance, and less loss from fraud 
and errors. 
B. Complementary Services 
Current proxy statements for SEC firms 
provide a description of the audit services 
performed by independent certified public 
accountants (CPAs). A typical description 
follows: the company's auditors provide 
services related to filings with the SEC, 
conduct reviews in connection with ac-
quisitions and mergers, examine and report 
on accounts and records of employee benefit 
plan trusts, and consult and provide other 
assistance in connection with various ac-
counting and financial reporting matters. 
Professional services by the independent 
CPAs which might be considered "non-audit" 
in nature and are commonly described in 
current proxy statements for SEC firms 
include: corporate tax consultation, prepara-
tion of corporate tax returns, preparation of 
foreign service employee tax returns on 
behalf of the company, advice and assistance 
related to development and security of 
computer-based systems, and various sur-
veys, studies, consultations, acquisition 
reviews, and other services. These descrip-
tions typify the products available from the 
auditor that have at least some costs in 
common with the audit. Once the financial 
statements have been examined for fairness, 
the auditor has substantial knowledge of a 
client's transactions. Such knowledge eases 
the planning of corporate tax matters and the 
preparation of tax returns as well as the 
performance of the other described services. 
Studies by regulators and numerous policy 
groups suggest that economies are obtained 
by using one public accounting firm to audit, 
to provide tax services, and to provide 
management advisory services as well. 
The interest of regulator and policy 
groups in the offering of multiple client 
services by an auditor stems from concern for 
the effects on an auditor's independence of 
providing complementary client services. If 
an auditor's independence was jeopardized, 
the monitoring value of an audit would 
decline, as would the information value of the 
financial statements. In fact, the insurance 
value of the audit would decline, due to the 
selection of an auditor who is perceived to 
lack independence. While questions of in-
dependence persist as complementary ser-
vices by an auditor have become com-
monplace, little evidence exists that 
maintenance of independence has become a 
problem. In contrast to the questionable costs 
of multiple services, the economies available 
from using multiple services from the same 
accounting firm are apparent.4 
C. Reliability Attributes 
The control mechanisms and by-product 
savings which are made available by an audit 
are accompanied by other attributes which 
improve the reliability of financial statements. 
In addition to increasing the trustworthiness 
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of the numbers as performance measures for 
agents, the audit provides an error check that 
makes the financial statements more reliable. 
An investor can compare the reliability of 
information produced by one firm relative to 
information produced by its competitors. 
Presumably, stockholders and creditors will 
"vote with their feet" by purchasing securities 
in a manner that rewards those firms which 
issue more reliable audited information. The 
amount of the reward will depend on the net 
benefits from using audited rather than 
unaudited data for decision making. 5 The 
"voting with their feet" actions of investors 
are more likely to be observed when the price 
adjustment process assumed under the 
stewardship hypothesis is somehow con-
strained. The constraint might be a usury 
ceiling or a set budget for loans that is 
allocated to a fixed group of borrowers 
without permitting competition across classes 
of borrowers. In the absence of constraints 
on price protection and diversification, the 
importance of the individual company's audit 
to a diversified investor is minimal. 
However, as audits are perceived to lessen 
the probability of major financial frauds, the 
independent attestation can contribute to the 
general perception of risk over a large 
number of risky investments and affect the 
level of savings and investment in the 
economy at the market level.6 The result is a 
lowering of systematic risk for investors. 
The auditor's function in determining the 
fairness of financial statements includes the 
enforcement of generally accepted account-
ing principles and compliance with the 
increased number of footnote disclosure 
requirements. These attributes decrease the 
information risk of any financial data 
presented to managers, stockholders, and 
creditors and thereby can enhance decision 
making. 
D. Regulatory Compliance 
The regulatory compliance attributes of an 
audit cannot be ignored as demand deter-
minants. "Going public" increases the 
marketability of a company's securities, but it 
is only possible through compliance with 
existing audit requirements. If this greater 
marketability stems from the ability of certain 
firms to distinguish themselves as high 
quality firms by means of the audit, then the 
audit would be valued apart from the 
minimum compliance requirement for the 
regulated firm. In addition, going public 
typically results in a greater number of 
agency relationships, increasing the agency 
costs of equity. Therefore, an increased 
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monitoring demand for auditing can be 
expected to accompany the legislative com-
pliance demand for an audit. 
As do stockholders, product purchasers 
often wish to distinguish between high and 
low quality suppliers, and the audit has been 
utilized as an information source to assist in 
selecting a supplier. For example, the Depart-
ment of Transportation in Florida requires 
audited financial statements for contractors 
bidding on construction. Assuming the 
customer base to which a company has 
access is effectively constrained by such 
customers' restrictions, the audit is a means 
of broadening a company's customer base. If 
audited statements are a prerequisite to going 
public, or to providing a firm's product or 
services for certain customer groups (for 
example, state agencies), then there is 
derived demand for the audit. 
E. Synopsis 
In the discussion of the stewardship, 
information, and insurance hypotheses, 
valued attributes of an audit were presented 
in the context of each hypothesis. However, 
the audit represents a package of services 
(with numerous joint products available) 
which is automatically received when a party 
contracts with an independent auditor, 
regardless of the primary rationale for being 
audited. Product attributes of the audit in-
clude: 
1. an ability to deter fraud and reporting 
abuses through 
a. fear of discovery and 
b. improved internal controls, 
2. a means of improving operating ef-
ficiency by implementing auditors' 
recommendations based on a review of 
operations during an audit, 
3. a common cost contribution toward 
complementary services when the same 
accounting firm is used for multiple 
services, 
4. improved reliability of financial informa-
tion which can reduce unsystematic 
and systematic risks of information and 
improve decision making, 
5. a means of complying with regulations, 
and 
6. a means of increasing the customer 
base to which a company has access. 
Each of these attributes will influence the 
total number of audits and related services 
that are demanded. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. Provide some specific examples of the 
"efficiency benefits" of an audit. Compare 
the nature and cost of such benefits to the 
alternative of hiring an outside manage-
ment consulting firm for advice. 
2. The SEC has frequently stated its concern 
over the possible effect on the auditor's 
independence of providing management 
advisory services. If the SEC were to 
mandate that auditors not provide 
management advisory services, how 
would such a ruling affect product at-
tributes of the audit? 
3. Why would consumers of audited financial 
statements value the auditor's enforce-
ment of generally accepted accounting 
principles for reporting purposes? 
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VII. 
Information Economics: 
The Costs and Benefits 
of Auditing 
A substantial body of literature exists 
concerning information theory (the 
economics of information including its 
production, dissemination, and manipulation 
in a market context as well as its role in 
bargaining and in macro theory) and the 
modeling of demand for audits in an informa-
tion economics framework. The literature 
formally supports the basic concepts underly-
ing the stewardship, information, and in-
surance hypotheses. An introduction to the 
terminology and critical concepts explored in 
these studies, as well as a summary of 
conclusions drawn, will provide additional 
insight as to the conditions which lead to a 
demand for auditing services. 
First, the necessary role of information in 
contracting and the incentives for sellers of a 
commodity to provide information on the 
commodity's quality are described. Second, 
the attributes of information that can be 
provided are described, as are the effects of 
the audit on these attributes. Third, an 
overview of all parties' incentives to provide 
information supports the classification of an 
audit as public, rather than private, informa-
tion and assists in explaining the authentica-
tion value of the audit in the market for 
information. Finally, the information concepts 
developed to support the demand for auditing 
are applied to describe cost fluctuations in an 
audit. Since the investment in audit services 
in the absence of regulation can be expected 
to continue up to the point where marginal 
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benefits equal marginal costs, it is relevant to 
assess the relationship of information theory 
to the benefits and costs to the auditee of an 
audit. 
A. The Necessary Role of Information 
Information theory distinguishes between 
two classes of information: (1) foreknowl-
edge, or information that is expected in 
advance and determined without further 
effort, such as weather information, which 
will in time be revealed by Nature herself; and 
(2) discovery, or information on hidden 
properties of Nature that only human action 
can extract, 1 such as a variance analysis of 
operations to pinpoint the sources of produc-
tion inefficiencies in a plant. One of these 
types of information must exist to facilitate 
contracting. 
1. A Basic Premise of Contracting 
The theory of contracts requires that the 
service contracted be described in a manner 
that permits the parties to observe whether or 
not the contract has been fulfilled. If the 
fulfillment of the contract is not measurable 
or observable, the contract cannot be en-
forced. Obviously the terms of the contract 
which make its fulfillment demonstrable can 
relate to an outcome, the absence of an 
event, observed performance, or measured 
performance (either directly or by surrogate). 
Performance does not have to be observable, 
as long as some performance result or some 
event is observable. 
In other words, foreknowledge can be the 
basis for a contract. For example, a contract 
could state that the manager will be paid if 
the company does not go bankrupt within a 
specified period. However, it typically would 
be costly to wait for such foreknowledge to 
reveal itself. Although the manager's compen-
sation is contingent on no bankruptcy, 
additional losses associated with a bankrupt 
operation might be avoided with earlier 
detection of the probable failure of the firm. 
Further, there is nothing to prevent the 
manager from being compensated and the 
company from going bankrupt the next day! 
Practical considerations dictate that the 
fulfillment of contractual terms be subject to 
detection at the relevant point in time 
(generally during the term of the contract, or 
at completion of the contractual service). The 
cost of having to wait for Nature to reveal 
herself beyond the desired time frame can 
deter contracting activities. 
Rather than wait for Nature's revelation, 
contracting parties will pay for discovery 
information to facilitate efficient contracting. 
In business, contracts are typically tied to 
some form of financial information. The 
parties to the contract implicitly determine 
the nature of the output or service by their 
selection of contract terms. 
Each party to a contract will try to 
maximize his own utility, and an efficient 
contract will consider ways of ensuring that 
the output from a contract will be as desired 
by both parties. For example, a manager who 
contracts to work for a set wage may place a 
positive value on leisure and may shirk some 
activities that could improve an owner's 
return. The owner of the firm being managed 
would like to hold the manager responsible 
for shirking or to provide incentives for the 
manager to work in order to maximize the 
owner's utility. 
A means of holding the manager responsi-
ble for shirking would be to set a desirable 
return to the owner as fixed and permit the 
manager to retain all of the excess return. 
However, the manager or agent is unlikely to 
be indifferent to accepting all of the residual 
risk of operations. In the face of uncon-
trollable business risks which cannot be fully 
shifted through diversification or through the 
purchase of insurance coverage, such an 
arrangement will be unacceptable to a risk-
averse manager without appropriate compen-
sation for the increased risk. To find a 
mutually acceptable agreement, risk-sharing 
and incentive effects have to be balanced.2 
Incentives for managers not to shirk exist 
in a market economy, regardless of whether 
the terms of the contract explicitly restrict 
shirking. The first incentive relates to the 
securities market. If a manager performs very 
poorly and that information becomes known, 
rational expectations theory dictates a 
downward valuation of the firm's securities. 
At some point the firm will become the target 
of a takeover and the new set of owners may 
well remove the present managers. The threat 
of takeover provides an incentive to managers 
not to shirk. 
The second incentive relates to the market 
for management labor. The present value of 
the future wage which a manager can get 
from alternative employment takes into con-
sideration past and present company perfor-
mance. Hence, a manager has a strong stake 
in the company's performance and overall 
success. Not only is he likely not to shirk his 
responsibilities, but he is also likely to 
monitor the activities of his associates in both 
higher and lower management to assure 
against their shirking. The importance of 
adjustments to future income available 
elsewhere and adjustments to current wages 
depends on how easily management can be 
replaced by competing managers and on 
whether the market for management labor is 
functioning well. If a manager is approaching 
retirement, the prospect of an adjustment to 
future income is an ineffective deterrent to 
shirking unless, of course, pensions are 
subject to adjustment.J 
Given that the markets for securities and 
for management labor operate to provide 
incentives for managers to behave in a 
manner consistent with the owners' interests, 
are explicit terms in contracts and more 
detailed performance measures required? 
Applying inductive reasoning, financial 
statements and auditing evolved as cost-
beneficial monitoring devices before regula-
tion in 1933 and 1934 and persist in un-
regulated environments today. Hence, even in 
the presence of efficient securities markets 
and a relatively sophisticated managerial 
labor market, additional measures of perfor-
mance are demanded. Further, bonding 
covenants requiring external audits are com-
mon, as is the use of earnings-based bonus 
payments. 
Of course, unaudited companies and 
compensation contracts which have set 
wages are also observed. However, this fact is 
consistent with the theory of contracts 
presented since alternative sources of infor-
mation are available to market participants. A 
principal may know that the utility function of 
an agent includes a highly valued work ethic 
and a moralistic attitude which precludes 
divergent actions. Or, substitutes for the 
external audit in the form of internal audits 
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and owner involvement in operations may be 
applied in the agency setting. Furthermore, 
high-performing managers may enjoy non-
wage privileges separate from an earnings-
based arrangement which supply adequate 
motivation to managers to act in their owners' 
interest. Given the fact that some contracts 
are not accompanied by the production of 
audited financial statements, what factors 
determine whether a contract will explicitly 
provide for the production of discovery 
information in the form of audited financial 
data? 
2. The Moral Hazard Phenomenon 
Discovery information as to the perfor-
mance of contractual terms will be demanded 
in situations in which the moral hazard 
phenomenon arises. Whenever the agent in 
question, e.g., a manager, may be personally 
motivated to take actions other than those 
that would have been specified in the 
contract by the owner if such specification 
had been possible, this phenomenon arises. 
The moral hazard phenomenon has been 
discussed extensively in textbooks concern-
ing insurance. For example, the moral hazard 
from the typical fire insurance contract is th~ 
increased likelihood that the managers of the 
insured company will expend less effort or 
money on safety precautions. (The costs of 
precautions fall directly on them, whereas the 
cost of a fire falls primarily on the insurer.) 
The insurance company, as do any principals, 
select information systems that balance the 
gains from improved contracting (e.g., 
providing incentives to take precautions) 
against the increased information costs (e.g., 
the cost of monitoring-making observable-
whether such precautions are actually taken). 
The presumption in this setting is that 
principals cannot adequately price-protect 
themselves in a mutually agreeable insurance 
contract without some monitoring mech-
anism. The moral hazard phenomenon 
provides a rationale for producing discovery 
information. Without such information 
production, the total amount of contracting 
would decline. 
3. The Adverse Selection Phenomenon 
The phenomenon identified as "adverse 
selection" could result whenever information 
is not produced and it is difficult or impossi-
ble for one party to otherwise assess the 
fulfillment of contractual terms. Consider 
the relation between security holders and 
managers in the securities market. If security 
buyers cannot distinguish high quality from 
low quality securities, the market prices will 
be adjusted to reflect the average expected 
quality of securities available for sale. This 
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implies that high quality firms would 
systematically receive such low prices that 
they would not find it attractive to offer their 
securities for sale and would withdraw from 
the market. Only inferior quality securities 
would remain. Since buyers would recognize 
the incentive of sellers of high quality 
securities to withdraw from the market, the 
investors would adjust the price of all 
securities downward to again reflect the 
average expected quality. More securities 
would consequently be withdrawn from the 
market, leaving only the lowest quality of 
security available for investors. 4 
If the sellers of securities can observe the 
relative quality of their securities, there are 
incentives for these sellers to take steps to 
make it known that their securities are of 
higher than average quality. In other words, 
the asymmetry of information whereby 
managers know the quality of their perfor-
mance, while principals do not, will cause 
total contracting to decline unless discovery 
information is made available to principals. 
4. Signalling Theory 
The steps taken by managers to ob-
tain recognition of their high quality 
securities have been formally described as 
"signals." "Signalling" is a kind of implicit 
guarantee. The seller (or other party giving a 
signal) engages in some supplemental activi-
ty that would be irrational were his claims not 
correct. One signal available to the firm is the 
providing of financial statements. Such 
signalling makes it possible for more high 
quality securities to be offered for sale at 
higher prices and reduces the effects of the 
adverse selection problem• in the securities 
market.5 
However, the asymmetry-of-information 
argument can also be applied to markets in 
which some suppliers of financial statements 
are dishonest6 and users of the reports are 
unable to distinguish dishonest from honest 
financial reports. Given, initially, that all 
companies provide financial statements, 
dishonest reporting can drive out honest 
reporting unless there is some means for 
purchasers to identify the honest reports. Ex-
post legal liability for false statements could 
serve as a deterrent, but a means of discover-
ing· the falsity of those reports not revealed by 
Nature is required. 
The institution which arose to counteract 
the effects of uncertainty about the quality (or 
reliability) of financial reporting was the 
independent audit. Since the auditing profes-
sion faced the same potential problem of 
dishonest auditors driving out honest 
auditors in the absence of some observable 
means of distinguishing between the two 
groups, licensing practices arose with cer-
tification to indicate the attainment of a 
recognized level of proficiency. A code of 
ethics was created and enforced to deter 
subsequent abuse.? Also, the legal liability of 
professional auditors under common law 
(and later under the securities acts) serves as 
an additional deterrent to dishonesty. 
The perceived importance of the quality 
differentiation role of auditing is supported in 
numerous surveys of shareholders. For exam-
ple, 94 percent of 711 investors in Australia 
stated they would buy shares in a public 
company only if it was audited. In addition, 93 
percent of this same random sample from 
stockholders of two major Australian com-
panies stated they would expect the auditor 
to be a member of a professional accounting 
society as evidence of his competence.8 
5. Synopsis 
This section introduced the concepts of 
essential elements for contract enforcement, 
shortcomings of foreknowledge as a basis for 
contracting, and consequent demands for 
discovery information. The requirement that a 
mutually acceptable agreement balance both 
risk-sharing and incentive effects implies that 
a role exists for contract terms tied to 
performance measures. The efficient 
securities market and the operation of the 
managerial labor market are admitted to 
constrain the degree to which agents' actions 
can diverge from principals' preferences. 
However, such constraints are inadequate 
substitutes for alternative performance 
measures in most agency relationships based 
on the observed demand for audited financial 
information. The factors that predict a de-
mand for discovery information on perfor-
mance include the existence of a moral 
hazard situation and the asymmetry of 
information between contracting parties. The 
demand for discovery information in the form 
of audited financial statements is a conse-
quence of the effects of the adverse selection 
phenomenon upon the securities market due 
to the signalling behavior of dishonest 
managers. The adverse selection 
phenomenon is also applied to the market for 
auditors to explain the observed professional 
activities of licensing and self-regulation. 
Having discussed the necessary role of 
information, the attributes of the information 
typically provided for contracting will be 
described. An understanding of how these 
attributes are enhanced by the performance 
of an audit will clarify the value of the audit as 
described by information theory. 
B. Information Attributes 
A number of attributes affect the value of 
information to potential users or producers. 
The certainty of the information, the extent of 
its dissemination, its applicability (i.e., par-
ticular to a single economic agent or of 
general applicability), its content (i.e., is the 
information about the physical environment 
or about the strategies or behavior of other 
individuals; does it concern tastes, resources, 
production functions, or market character-
istics like price and quality), and its decision-
relevance all affect the economic significance 
of information.9 Three major attributes of 
information have been the center of analysis 
in applications of information theory to 
accounting: noise, bias, and fineness. 
Noise refers to unintentional error in the 
accounting process. The error reduces the 
reliability of accounting information (given 
that some reliability is expected). Specifically, 
noise reduces the degree to which account-
ing messages correspond to underlying 
economic events. The more noise in a piece 
of information, the less useful it is as a basis 
for assessing performance. Whenever the 
ability to assess the fulfillment of a contract's 
terms is lessened due to noise in the selected 
performance measures, the total set of 
contracting opportunities found to be mutual-
ly acceptable will be reduced. Further, the 
inability to clearly distinguish noise from valid 
information contributes to the adverse selec-
tion problem in the markets for securities and 
commodities. 
Bias refers to managers' incentive to 
"window-dress" financial statements in their 
favor. If compensation is tied to earnings, 
managers would have incentives to overstate 
performance measures (until discovery) in 
order to be systematically overpaid. Or, if 
managers and their principals are facing 
retaliation for large profits by regulators, an 
incentive would exist to understate perfor-
mance measures. (Although the theft of 
assets by management can result in the 
misstatement of financial position, such theft 
is not defined as a source of biased informa-
tion. Theft is a source of physical asset loss, 
the incorrect accounting of which would bias 
the financial statements.) 
The fineness of accounting information 
relates to its information content in the 
absence of unintentional errors. A reporting 
function is finer than another coarser report-
ing function if it provides more information 
to the owner of an entity.10 An example is 
provided by comparing the aggregate, rather 
coarse account titles that were once permissi-
ble in financial reporting (like an Appropria-
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tion for Contingencies) to the detail now 
required in finer, more informative titles (such 
as Appropriation for Litigation and Ap-
propriation for Contract Disputes). 
Based on analytical evaluations of the 
three major attributes of accounting informa-
tion, the literature supports several con-
clusions concerning the relationship of the 
audit to each attribute. The first of these 
conclusions relates to a necessary role for the 
audit. It is demonstrable that only a pure 
wage agreement (a set dollar compensation 
with no dependence on performance 
measures) will induce managers to report 
truthfully, i.e., without bias. Yet, a pure wage 
payment provides neither incentives for an 
agent to perform nor a basis for risk-sharing 
between parties to a contract. In a moral 
hazard situation the optimum contract will try 
to balance risk-sharing and incentive effects. 
To facilitate this balance, some auditing 
services and a related penalty function tied to 
the discovery of bias in reporting are required 
to decrease the probable bias of the informa-
tion produced by managers. 11 
The second conclusion relates to the 
audit's effect on signalling. There is a 
signalling effect in a manager's selection of 
reporting methods. Stockholders may utilize 
the fineness of the reporting method chosen 
as one of the criteria for judging managers. 
The auditor's certification as to the conformi-
ty of financial statements with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
provides a minimum signal of fineness which, 
alone, gives the audit function value. 
However, additional signals are emitted by 
managers' selections of reporting techniques 
within GAAP, and the auditor provides the 
service of attesting to the overall fairness of 
the footnote description of key accounting 
policies. 12 For example, if an owner is 
primarily interested in total earnings as a 
basis for predicting a company's future cash 
flows, LIFO may provide more information to 
the owner during a period of inflation than a 
FIFO inventory valuation method. Similarly, 
more detailed data provided in the form of 
additional and supplementary disclosures 
and the voluntary provision of management 
forecasts are likely to provide more informa-
tion to the owners and signal good perfor-
mance by the managers. In contrast, coarser 
disclosures are more likely to be issued by 
managers who are hedging themselves from 
the owners' detection of poor performance. 
The third conclusion relates to noise. 
Auditors will require the correction of ac-
cidental errors which are material, when 
discovered through the audit process. The 
correction of errors will lower the noise in 
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accounting information. Even if no errors are 
discovered, the principals are assured by the 
auditor that there is no material noise in the 
financial statements. The availability of a less 
noisy measure of performance will increase 
the total set of contracting opportunities and 
will be a deterrent to the adverse selection 
phenomenon. 
The fourth conclusion relates to the 
overall benefits of lowered noise, bias, and 
coarseness in accounting data that accrue 
from an audit. The improved quality of 
financial reports will improve managers' 
decision making since the risk and return of 
investment projects can be more accurately 
assessed. To the extent that the audit 
facilitates the use of wage schemes tied to 
performance measures, it can motivate 
managers to expend more effort. In fact, firms 
utilizing other than pure wage contracts have 
performed better in the stock market, imply-
ing favorable effects on real output. 13 
Having introduced the valued attributes of 
information and how they are enhanced by an 
audit, the question arises as to who produces 
the audited financial statements and whether 
they are typically produced as private or as 
public information. 
C. Private and Public Information 
Production 
The incentives of private individuals to 
produce information for their own use or for 
distribution to others stem from the ability to 
speculate and/or resell the information. The 
resale or publicizing of the information is the 
means of making the information sufficiently 
public to obtain the price shift necessary to 
receive trading gains. In addition to the mere 
transfer of resources among traders (which 
results in distributive gains and losses), 
productive gains can be realized by the 
individual from investing in more productive 
opportunities. Further, as privately produced 
information is disseminated, other individuals 
will adapt to the information and will shift 
their commitment of resources toward more 
productive investments. Distributive gains 
and losses do not affect the total wealth, but 
simply shift resources away from those 
without information to individuals with infor-
mation. In contrast, productive gains enhance 
the total allocation of resources. 
As opposed to the eventual publicizing of 
private information, public information results 
in an immediate adjustment of prices and a 
shift in productive resources. Given the 
efficiency of the securities market, little if any 
value accrues to the private individual from 
direct trading activities on public information. 
However, the perceived relative gain from 
taking speculative positions is not as ap-
parent. As differences in tastes or beliefs 
concerning economic activities arise, people 
are likely to believe that such disagreements 
in taste really stem from their own possession 
of superior information. The perception that 
they are right will encourage them to invest 
and to then expend resources generating 
public information to convince others of their 
opinion. The same thought process results in 
the production of public information by 
parties holding opposite opinions. In addition 
to the parties honestly wishing to convey 
public information in support of their own 
opinions, fraud perpetrators will expend 
resources to convey inauthentic public infor-
mation in an attempt to reap profits. While 
disincentives to producing fraudulent infor-
mation exist (in the form of criminal 
penalties), such production can be expected 
to occur, although not extensively. 
The effect of perceived relative gains and 
desired profits by both honest and fraudulent 
information producers is that the production 
of public information tends to be excessive 
relative to its social value. An implication of 
this excessive production is that an indepen-
dent attestation as to the performance of a 
company can be valuable. The auditor can 
assist in identifying information as being 
either authentic or inauthentic. Further, 
auditors can assess the information content 
of information generated to support opposing 
opinions. (For example, auditors would 
compare optimistic forecasts by management 
to industry forecasts, predictions concerning 
the general economy, and other sources of 
information concerning future company per-
formance.) Due to the intention to persuade, 
the information producers may claim to have 
proven some opinion although in actuality the 
data produced are devoid of, or are at best 
neutral in, information content. Auditors can 
help to sift through such information and 
avoid the nonproductive effects of relying on 
misleading information. The audit increases 
the value of public information as an effective 
signal of its quality by increasing the preci-
sion of the information. 
Information theory analytically relates the 
size of expenditures on information monitor-
ing and evaluation (such as the expenditures 
on an audit) to a consensus judgment by 
market participants as to the degree of 
precision associated with the information. 
The implication of the observed expenditures 
on auditing is that the audit is a valued device 
for making the financial report more precise. 
Information theory predicts that when a firm's 
financial statements are believed to have a 
greater degree of precision, they will be 
weighted more heavily by decision makers 
and can be expected to improve investment 
decisions. 
Public information has been classified as 
good news and bad news. Obviously, from a 
distributive gain or loss perspective, one's 
personal investment position makes news 
good or bad. However, from a total produc-
tivity perspective, it is possible to identify 
good news which increases total output and 
bad news which decreases total output. 
Although there are incentives for individuals 
to produce public information, if that informa-
tion is bad news of a discovery type, 
incentives exist for individuals to suppress 
the dissemination of the information. 
(Foreknowledge bad news presumably can-
not be suppressed.) In fact, since individuals 
on the whole are assumed to be risk-averse, 
they would be willing to pay something to 
suppress the bad information until they have 
hedged themselves against the impact of the 
information. Without effective hedging, large 
distributive losses will be incurred, with a 
greater number of losers from the wealth 
transfers than winners. The distributive losses 
have formed the basis for claims in the 
literature that bad news through public 
information may have a negative social value. 
However, the redirection of total productive 
resources toward more productive investment 
based on bad news can yield returns apart 
from losses due to wealth transfers and may 
even offset the distributive losses. The point 
is analogous to the detection of bankruptcy at 
an earlier date leaving investors better off by 
permitting investors to shift their resources 
either to improve operations or to alternative 
investment opportunities. 
A practical barrier exists to suppressing 
discovery bad news which relates to in-
dividuals' maximization of their own utility. 
Whenever information is suppressed, the 
private value of the information will 
necessarily increase. The suppression 
attempts can backfire and as individuals have 
increased incentives to find out the informa-
tion and trade on it for large gains, the 
distributive risk of loss for the majority of 
individuals increases. By applying the more 
losers than winners argument, actions by 
market participants to reduce secrecy and the 
suppression of information through demands 
for public dissemination of information can 
be understood as an effective means of 
lowering the distributive risks of investment. 
An example of one regulation which 
makes the concern for distributive risk 
explicit is the restriction on insider trading by 
corporate managers. Typically investments by 
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managers in their own company's stock, such 
as investments through stock option plans, 
must be held at least six months before 
reselling the shares. The rationale for holding 
period restrictions is that in an efficient 
market suppression of inside information is 
unlikely to be effective over the long term; 
hence large distributive losses to the public 
from managers' trading activities are unlikely. 
Given that private incentives exist to 
produce and to disseminate both good and 
bad news, it is unclear that regulations 
mandating the production of information are 
appropriate. Unless a market failure can be 
demonstrated, the absence of a particular 
piece of information is likely to reflect the 
consensus judgment that the costs of 
generating that information exceed the 
benefits of its production and use, since 
otherwise incentives would exist for someone 
to produce the desired information. 
The SEC mandated the production and 
dissemination of audit reports by cor-
porations, yet most of the corporations had 
voluntarily disseminated that information 
prior to the regulation. The implication of 
voluntary production of public information is 
that the reallocation of productive resources 
and the automatic reduction of the dis-
tributional effects otherwise possible from 
generating private information (for which 
investors are willing to pay higher wages to 
management) adequately compensate com-
panies for the production of audit reports. A 
contributing factor to the classification of 
audit reports as public rather than private 
information is the cost of information produc-
tion. Initially, British auditors were hired by 
British businessmen to monitor investments 
in the United States. However, as soon as the 
auditors developed professional societies 
in the United States, companies themselves 
began hiring auditors, making the audited 
information available to investors. Often the 
information was made public to noninvestors 
as well. The implication of this historical 
development of audited statements is that 
companies have cost advantages in 
generating and disseminating audited finan-
cial statements relative to individual investors. 
These cost advantages coupled with 
managers' valuation of the signalling effects 
of audited financial statements on the total 
public help to explain the commonality of 
making audit results public information. 
The benefits of producing audited infor-
mation have been explored with little discus-
sion of the related costs. The interaction of 
auditee attributes and cost fluctuations in an 
audit reflects the basic concepts of informa-
tion theory already introduced. Since the 
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investment in audit services will be based on 
a cost-benefit comparison, it is relevant to 
complete the information economics 
framework by briefly discussing the cost side 
of the audit decision. 
D. The Costs of Auditing 
The contract between an aud itee and 
auditor must have terms which can be 
enforced. However, an asymmetrical informa-
tion problem exists. While the auditor knows 
whether he has performed a professional 
audit, it is difficult for the auditee (or principal 
of the auditee) to distinguish a good audit 
from a poor audit. To deter the adverse 
selection phenomenon, CPAs have organized 
professional societies, have set examination, 
experience, and education requirements for 
certification, and have actively enforced a 
code of ethics as a means of making it 
possible for an auditee to determine exper-
tise. Accounting firms have established well-
known reputations and have participated in. 
peer review and continuing education 
programs to further demonstrate their com-
mitment to performing professional audits. 
The production of information by the auditor 
as to his competence, necessary in light of 
information theory, increases the cost of the 
audit to an auditee. Obviously, the auditee 
has the option of expending resources on 
private information as to the competence of 
an auditor and may be able to lower total 
costs by, for example, choosing an auditor 
who has a less well established national 
reputation but is known to be of similar 
quality (based on private information 
sources). 
The reputation of an auditor is only one 
component of audit costs. The costs of the 
audit have been analytically and empirically 
tied to the following factors: 
1. the legal environment with respect to 
auditor/auditee third party liability, 
affected in part by the following 
characteristics: 
a. the proportion of public versus 
closely held auditees in an auditor's 
portfolio of clients, 
b. auditee size,14 
c. evidence of clients being in financial 
distress, and 
d. the loss experience of the auditor; 
2. internal characteristics of the audit 
engagement which may be called the 
determinants of the degree of audit 
difficulty: 
a. internal control of the auditee, 
b. auditee complexity, e.g., degree of 
decentralization and extent of foreign 
operations, and 
c. characteristics of the accounting, 
such as industry peculiarities; 
3. the economies of staff specialization, 
particularly available to large auditing 
firms; and 
4. the economies from industry specializa-
tion by an audit firm. 15 
The general media distribute public infor-
mation on the loss experience of the auditor, 
including losses from litigation and client 
losses due to SEC-administered penalties and 
voluntary client turnover. The auditees have 
private information on their internal 
characteristics that are likely to influence the 
audit costs. Auditing firms have incentives to 
distribute public information as to who their 
clients are as a means of attracting auditees 
who value the auditors' industry specializa-
tion. The available public information and the 
opportunity to generate private information 
on the relevant cost factors imply that 
auditees can select an auditor based on a 
cost-benefit analysis. 
In addition to selecting an auditor, the 
auditee has some latitude in specifying the 
extent of auditing. Although generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) repre-
sent a minimum "extent of auditing" below 
which the auditee is penalized by the 
issuance of an audit report that has a scope 
limitation type of qualification, the auditee 
can contract for extended audit tests. 
The minimum standard of GAAS can be 
described as an additional means of avoiding 
the adverse selection phenomenon and 
providing one basis for the auditee to eval-
uate an auditor's performance. In addition, 
GAAS represents a minimum standard below 
which an auditor faces legal liability respon-
sibilities. The inference is that GAAS is a 
minimum risk-sharing basis for audit con-
tracts and complies with the basic premise of 
contracting discussed in Section VII. A. 1. 
The extent of auditing has been viewed 
analytically as first increasing the auditee's 
efforts to perform productively in the interests 
of his principals and then decreasing such 
efforts beyond a certain point. Such a moti-
vation effect infers some optimal extent of 
auditing with respect to the criterion of how 
much effort is expended by auditees. To tie in 
the prior discussion of information theory, the 
degree to which the bias of information is 
deterred by the audit will increase up to a 
certain level of auditing and then will decline. 
In other words, the threat value of the audit is 
limited. 
An economic rationale for the level of 
auditing not deterring bias beyond a certain 
point is provided by the law of diminishing 
returns. Discovery of material errors, bias, 
and noncompliance with GAAP is most likely 
to occur up to some reasonable level of 
auditing beyond which the costs are unlikely 
to justify the low probability of subsequent 
discovery of material misstatement of finan-
cial reports. 
The final cost choice of the auditee, other 
than an information and extent-of-auditing 
choice, relates to internal control. The 
amount of audit tests required to reach the 
minimum GAAS compliance level varies with 
the quality of the internal control system of 
an auditee. Since the CPAs have respon-
sibilities for maintaining their expertise over a 
broad scope of services and face substantial 
legal liability exposure, the costs of their 
services are likely to be high relative to the 
cost of having those same services performed 
by an auditee's employees. The client can 
improve the cost-benefit decision of contract-
ing with an auditor by performing an on-
going analysis of the trade-offs between the 
improvement of internal controls (including 
the use of internal auditors) and the extent of 
the external audit. Information theory clearly 
suggests concern for bias when parties 
lacking independence generate information. 
Similarly, the fineness of information can be 
decreased if there is insufficient overview by 
an independent party. However, theory also 
supports the ability of the auditor to rely on 
good internal control systems as a 
mechanism for decreasing the noise in the 
accounting information, thereby lowering the 
quantity of testing required by the external 
auditor. 
E. Synopsis 
The inability of principals to easily assess 
firms' performance, managers' efforts, and 
auditors' performance contributes toward a 
demand for professionally organized certified 
public accountants to perform independent 
examinations of financial statements. Without 
audits, the total amount of contracting 
activities would decline and the adverse 
selection phenomenon would increase in 
severity. Information dissemination 
arrangements that balance the gains from 
improved contracting (i.e., decrease the 
moral hazard) against information costs have 
evolved in business, and they typically 
incorporate audited financial statements and 
incentive schemes tied to audited perfor-
mance measures. 
Signalling theory formally describes the 
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ability of sellers to make the quality of their 
products known to investors as a means of 
improving the basis for contracting. Specif-
ically, an audit can signal less noise or error 
in the financial report, greater fineness in the 
reporting methods (including compliance 
with GAAP), and unbiased performance 
measures. Improved information affects 
managers' optimal decisions in addition to 
influencing the quality and selection of 
financial reporting practices. While the 
assumption of rational expectations, the 
existence of an efficient securities market, 
and the operation of the managerial labor 
market constrain the degree to which agents' 
actions can diverge from principals' 
preferences, auditing evolved as a cost-
beneficial monitoring device before SEC 
regulation and persists in the non-SEC 
sectors to provide an improved means of 
narrowing such a divergence by increasing 
the principals' ability to assess agents' perfor-
mance. 
While incentives exist to produce both 
private and public audit information, the cost 
advantages to the manager in providing such 
information, the legal restrictions on insider 
trading, the difficulty in suppressing informa-
tion dissemination, the negative effects on 
most individuals from the distributive effects 
of private information, and the signalling 
benefits imply that audits primarily represent 
the production of public information. The 
incentive to overproduce public information 
and the existence of fraudulent public infor-
mation increase the authentication value of 
the audit. 
The costs of the audit reflect auditors' 
actions to distinguish good audits from poor 
audits, auditors' professional liability ex-
perience and current exposure to litigation, 
auditees' characteristics, and the degree to 
which the auditors' professional staffs spe-
cialize over time and by industry. Each of 
these cost determinants relates to information 
theory and can be assessed by using avail-
able public information or by generating 
private information. Analytical examination of 
the audit function and empirical evidence 
suggests an optimal extent of auditing for an 
auditee exists which encompasses a 
preferred trade-off of internal controls and 
the extent of the external audit, as well as an 
optimum level of motivation for the auditee to 
act in the principals' best interests. 
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Questions for Discussion 
1. a. How do the essentials of contracting 
influence the demand for audits? 
b. Compare foreknowledge and discovery 
information as means for specifying 
contracting terms. 
c. If only foreknowledge was available, 
what would be the likely effect on 
contracting activities? 
2. Pure wage contracts are observed. Are 
such contracts inconsistent with the claim 
that contracting parties will attempt to 
balance risk-sharing and incentive 
effects? Explain. 
3. "Substantial long-term divergence in 
managers' actions and owners' prefer-
ences can persist in today's market if the 
entity is unaudited." Critically comment 
on the validity of this claim. 
4. Provide an example of a market which 
appears to exemplify a severe case of 
adverse selection. Suggest a parallel to 
the audit that could improve the market, 
i.e., that could decrease the severity of 
the adverse selection phenomenon. 
5. Describe the signalling behavior of 
auditors and of corporate managers. 
Provide specific examples. 
6. What information attributes of a cor-
poration's financial statements are in-
fluenced by the audit? Be specific, 
applying appropriate terminology in your 
explanations. 
7. Based on your background in financial 
accounting, discuss how fineness relates 
to the development of accounting prin-
ciples and financial reporting techniques 
through time. Provide specific examples. 
8. Are distributive risks relevant to both 
private and public information produc-
tion? Explain. 
9. "While companies can be relied upon to 
disseminate good news, they cannot be 
expected to voluntarily disseminate bad 
news." Critically comment on the validity 
of this statement. Apply the theories of 
rational expectations and signalling in 
your analysis. 
10. How does information production in the 
private markets of venture capital equity 
securities and of private placement for 
debt securities relate to public informa-
tion production? 
11. "It is not possible to overproduce public 
information because it is a public good." 
Critically evaluate this claim. 
12. Only two companies disseminated ac-
countants' reports on internal accounting 
controls as public information prior to 
1979. In 1979 the SEC issued a proposal 
to require such reports. Due to over-
whelming, negative reactions from the 
public (including companies, auditors, 
and report users in the private sector), the 
Commission withdrew the proposal for a 
three-year waiting period. This period is 
intended to give the accounting profes-
sion adequate time to develop their own 
guidelines for such reports and to en-
courage production of this form of public 
information. 
a. Is the absence of internal accounting 
control reports a market failure? Ex-
plain. 
b. What are the likely effects of the SEC 
proposal and its subsequent 
withdrawal? 
c. What changes would you predict in the 
cost characteristics of an audit if the 
SEC proposal had been implemented? 
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VIII. 
The Supply of Audits 
The text has presented alternative (or 
complementary) explanations for the ob-
served demand for auditing services and the 
specific attributes of the audit product which 
are of value to consumers. The information 
economics theory that underlies the descrip-
tion of the determinants of a demand for 
auditing provides formal support for the 
hypotheses. Although the determinants of 
cost fluctuations related to the auditing 
service have been briefly described, the 
nature of the supply of audits has not been 
explored. 
The standard economic analysis of the 
nature of supply of a commodity typically 
begins with the identification of the firm's 
production function for the commodity. A 
production function defines the quantity of 
output as a function of various inputs, e.g., 
capital and labor. The production function 
presupposes technical efficiency and man-
agers' selection of the best combination of 
inputs to produce a particular level of output. 
A. Inputs and Outputs 
The audit report is valued by consumers. 
The value is based on the amount by which 
an audit increases the probability of detection 
of material errors and nonconformity with 
GAAP and provides insurance to interested 
parties. A by-product already cited is the 
improvement of operating efficiency which 
results from auditors' suggestions concerning 
internal control and production operations. 
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Private incentives and the presence of regula-
tion imply the output of a "certification" 
which facilitates public trading of securities, 
expansion of the customer base, and 
qualification for revenue sharing and similar 
programs. 
The inputs to the audit production func-
tion will be studied in depth throughout the 
auditing course but can be typified as a 
highly labor-intensive application of 
generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS). The general factors of production, 
labor and capital, are reflected in varied 
proportions in the available auditing tech-
niques. The factor mix decision emphasized 
here focuses on the mix of audit tests applied, 
given an auditee. There is variability in the 
task of GAAS compliance which permits the 
selection of a factor mix, with some con-
straints on particular inputs. 
Three characteristics of any production 
operation particularly affect its cost the 
output rate, the contemplated total volume, 
and the programmed delivery dates. Eco-
nomic theory predicts that as the output rate 
increases, costs increase; as total volume 
increases, unit costs decrease; and the more 
distant the calendar date of delivery, the 
smaller the cost-within the normal range of 
operations.1 Since auditing is primarily per-
formed on an annual basis, with auditees 
commonly reporting on a calendar year-end, 
the total volume of output (number of audit 
reports) is concentrated in the months of 
January through April. However, efforts to 
lower audit costs by both auditees and 
auditors are exemplified by auditees 
switching to other fiscal year-ends, by the 
auditor's increased application of interim 
review and compliance testing techniques, 
and by the reduction of fees to auditees that 
do not impose a tight constraint on the 
delivery date of the auditor's report. Regu-
lators prescribe reporting deadlines which 
lead to increased audit costs. The infamous 
"busy season" with substantial overtime costs 
(demonstrating the increased costs that 
accompany an increased rate of production) 
is to some extent a result of such regulation. 
While a timely audit is admittedly of greater 
information value, the regulations preclude a 
cost-benefit assessment of an optimal 
delivery date by the consumer and producer. 
Large costs are involved in an initial audit 
these costs relate to learning about the 
enterprise. For this reason auditees have an 
incentive to retain the same auditor over time. 
Auditor retention creates appropriable quasi-
rents (payments that have no effect on the 
amount of the good in existence now, but 
which do affect the current rate of production 
and hence the amount that will exist in the 
future) to auditors and auditees, depending 
on how the audit fees are paid-lump sum or 
annualized. The compliance with GAAS 
(meaning all established standards including 
specific requirements as to audit techniques, 
as found in some official pronouncements) 
imposes a floor below which costs cannot 
fall. However, the floor is influenced by the 
length of the audit relationship. For example, 
the taking of physical inventory, the distribu-
tion of confirmations, the identification of 
illegal payments, and the review of internal 
controls are all required under GAAS and are 
some of the determinants of a floor to 
auditing costs. However, prior performance of 
these auditing procedures will increase the 
efficiency of a subsequent year's audit. The 
time involved in an initial review of internal 
controls relative to the time involved in a 
review of changes in controls since the last 
audit is one demonstration of the increased 
efficiency of ongoing audit relationships. In 
addition to the duration of an audit relation-
ship, the auditor and auditee characteristics 
discussed in Section VII affect auditing costs. 
For example, the auditor's extent of reliance 
on the auditee's internal control is a factor 
mix decision by the auditor that contributes 
to the variability of the GAAS-compliance 
audit task and influences the cost of the 
audit. 
Auditing standards constrain the pro-
ducers in making their factor employment 
decision. The best quantity of an input, such 
as a particular auditing technique, for the 
accounting firm to employ will vary with the 
costs and returns of employing that input. For 
example, the extent to which tests of an 
internal accounting control system are valued 
auditing procedures depends on the costs of 
performing compliance tests and on the 
extent to which the tests provide an evidential 
basis for issuing an audit report relative to 
time spent on competing inputs, such as 
substantive tests (i.e., audit tests of year-end 
financial statement balances). If a standard 
were set that required compliance tests of 
internal accounting control regardless of 
whether the tests were cost-beneficial to the 
auditor, the costs of production would 
increase relative to the firm's market-
determined choice of factors (provided this 
market is efficient). The extent of the increase 
in costs due to auditing standards will depend 
on the extent to which those setting stan-
dards have full information on auditing firms. 
The costs will increase by the loss from 
·employing inefficient methods.2 
The probability of discovery of material 
error will eventually begin to diminish when 
the extent of auditing increases. In addition 
there will be a diminishing positive effect on 
managers' incentives once a certain point is 
reached. These two observations imply that 
the supply production function will not result 
in the full discovery of misstated financial 
statements. In other words, an "optimal" level 
of fraud and misstatement in financial 
statements exists for which the costs of 
detection exceed the related benefits. 
B. Effects of Asymmetrical 
Information 
The characteristics of the output of the 
audit production function, as suggested 
earlier, lead to an asymmetry of information 
between the auditor and the auditee (or its 
principals) concerning the quality of an audit. 
This factor explains, in part, the pricing of 
audit services. Audit fees are largely a 
function of the observable inputs of the pro-
duction, i.e., the number of hours spent by 
the auditors on an engagement. In addition to 
numerous standards on the form of audit 
reports, the input process of the audit is 
emphasized in audit standard-setting with 
respect to the necessary means for gathering 
sufficient audit evidence and the preparation 
of working papers. The evidence upon which 
auditors rely in determining their assessment 
of the probability of material error is recorded 
in working papers as one means of making 
the probability of detection more observable.3 
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The working papers provide a road map of 
the auditor's decision process and the audit-
ing techniques applied. The current empha-
sis on statistical sampling and analytical 
review strengthens the ability to determine 
quantitatively how the samples investigated 
during an audit affect the probability of 
material errors going undetected. 
Other means to assure that the essential 
inputs, such as compliance with GAAS, 
actually enter the audit process and are made 
observable via the working papers' record of 
evidence are the enforcement of licensing 
requirements and professional ethics and the 
process of peer review. Although quality 
issues are the primary focus of GAAS, little 
doubt exists that the working paper evidence 
provides a basis for determining whether the 
quantity and quality of the audit work are 
adequate. Further, some of the GAAS re-
quirements relate to observable inputs which 
provide overt evidence to the auditee that an 
audit has been performed, including confir-
mation and inventory procedures. In fact, the 
typical practice of the auditors performing 
most of the audit procedures on the premises 
of the auditee, while primarily explained by 
practicality and convenience, enhances the 
observability of the audit as well as the threat 
value of the audit to the auditee's employees. 
C. Potential Barriers to Entry 
It would be inappropriate to highlight the 
observability qualities of licensing require-
ments without acknowledging that such 
practices can have anti-competitive effects. 
However, the "certified" accountants 
historically have competed with other ac-
countants, suggesting that the certification is 
primarily a signalling device, rather than a 
restrictive barrier to entry.4 The economics 
literature formally supports the concept that 
an agency which certifies that a private 
individual has certain skills, yet does not 
prevent, in any way, the practice of these 
skills in any occupation by people who do not 
have a certificate provides a quality signal 
that does not result in the special producer 
group (e.g., CPAs) holding a monopoly 
position at the expense of the rest of the 
public. 5 Although the practices of non-CPAs 
are constricted under current legislation, an 
historical perspective suggests non-CPAs 
have been allowed to compete with CPAs. 
Not only is there no prevention of practice 
by non-CPAs, there is ample opportunity to 
become a CPA. The requirements to become 
certified do not represent substantial barriers 
to entry in the sense that the requirements 
would likely be met by typical professional 
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training and practice in the absence of the 
certification standards. An effective monopo-
ly position for CPAs via barriers to entry will 
not evolve under conditions of competition by 
non-CPAs and the setting of licensing stan-
dards at an average level of expected 
professional knowledge. 
Ironically, a barrier to entry into the CPA 
profession has evolved as a by-product of 
regulation. This barrier relates to the develop-
ment and support of current expertise for 
audits and related specialized services. Just 
to keep up with the regulators' pronounce-
ments requires a substantial commitment to 
training, support facilities with reference 
materials, and elaborate information systems. 
This commitment, which grows with govern-
ment regulation, can make it difficult for small 
accounting firms to be economically feasible 
operations. In addition, since the awards for 
legal liability are unrelated to the auditor's 
fees, a small auditing firm with physical 
limitations to diversifying its risk (particularly 
given the aforementioned limitations on 
professional liability insurance coverage 
available to an auditor at reasonable cost) 
can find it extremely difficult to provide 
auditing services. The difficulty increases as 
the regulation of client companies increases. 
While in the absence of regulation small 
auditing firms would face competition from 
larger firms with economies of scale, 6 in-
tervention by government, including 
numerous disclosure requirements, has in-
creased such economies. 
Even the effective barrier to the entry of 
small accounting firms imposed by the 
quantity of government regulation and the 
resultant prevalence of large auditing firms in 
both the unregulated and regulated markets 
does not suggest an absence of competition. 
In fact, no evidence exists of price fixing or 
market-sharing, and empirically there is 
evidence of price competition among firms7 
and a number of auditor changes by 
auditees.8 The concentration of public ac-
counting firms9 appears to be largely at-
tributable to economies of scale in serving 
large auditees, in permitting the industry 
specialization of professional staff, and in 
meeting the educational demands that 
primarily stem from government regulations. 
D. Synopsis 
The audit was an economically feasible 
method of monitoring that was demanded 
before 1934. The total supply of auditing 
services obviously has fluctuated with the 
availability and cost of labor inputs-
influenced by such factors as competing 
offers from purchasers of accounting labor 
other than auditing firms and the availability 
of accounting training at universities-and 
the total growth in economic transactions.10 
The nature of the supply of audits has been 
briefly described, including the claimed anti-
competitive effects of licensing and of 
government regulation. Having focused 
primarily on the demand for and supply of 
audits in an unregulated environment, atten-
tion must be paid to the general effects of 
regulation to gain a thorough understanding 
of the economic role of the audit in both free 
and regulated markets. 
Growth in regulation has been claimed to 
be an important determinant of demand and 
has undeniably led to an increase in the 
number of audits by regulated companies. 
Whether regulation increases the total supply 
of auditing depends on the strength of two 
opposing forces. Since regulation simultane-
ously raises the cost of production and 
increases the demand for audits, it is theo-
retically ambiguous as to what overall effect 
regulation has had on the quantity of auditing 
services. However, effects of specific types of 
accounting and auditing regulations on the 
quantity of auditing (and complementary) 
services demanded can be identified, as 
discussed in Section IX. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. List the primary inputs to the audit pro-
duction function. Do capital investments 
pose a barrier to entry into the auditing 
profession? Elaborate. 
2. Regulation has increased the amount of 
audit services produced in the economy. 
Critically comment. 
3. a. Assume that the government eliminated 
all non-common law regulations affect-
ing auditing services. How would this 
action affect the market for auditing 
services? 
b. Assume that private standard-setting 
was also eliminated. How would this 
affect the market for auditing services? 
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IX. 
A look at Regulation 
While it is not possible theoretically to 
state the effect of regulation on the total 
demand for auditing services, it is possible to 
draw analogies between the nature of regula-
tion in the auditing sector and other govern-
ment regulation. Such analogies facilitate an 
understanding of regulation's influence on 
the market for auditing services. The purpose 
of this section is to make the reader cogni-
zant of a possible divergence in the intent of 
regulation and the effect of regulation, as well 
as a possible divergence in politicians' self-
interests and the public interest. The issues 
raised are oversimplified and the considera-
tion of additional economic issues with an 
application of other analytical tools would 
generate a more powerful analysis. However, 
a brief introduction to the economics of 
regulation in general and to SEC and 
accounting regulation in particular (with a 
focus on how regulation affects auditing) is 
provided in the hopes that the interested 
reader will further investigate relevant issues. 
A. A Price Floor Effect 
An audit requirement, particularly when 
combined with increases in minimum 
auditing standards, can be expected to have a 
market effect similar to a price floor (a price 
above the price in an unregulated market). 
When a price floor is set and is operative, the 
quantity demanded will decline. The decline 
in the demand for audit services could be 
reflected in a greater number of companies 
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choosing not to "go public" or in a decrease 
in demand for complementary services, such 
as budget planning. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the quantity of private 
(direct) placements increased rapidly after 
the SEC Act of 1934.1 
B. Input or Tax Subsidization 
Changes in auditing standards can be 
compared to a subsidy by government of one 
of the inputs to production or to a tax subsidy 
by government, depending on the nature of 
the auditing standard being prescribed. Any 
input subsidy will alter the nature and shape 
of the audit production function. If the 
subsidy is an input (an audit procedure) that 
is not effective in generating greater output in 
the form of a greater probability of detecting 
misstatements, the subsidy can have an effect 
similar to rationing. In other words, if the 
price pressure on total auditors' services is 
sufficient to preclude compliance with the 
ineffective standard by carrying out current 
auditing procedures, the requirement can 
operate as a physical rationing of available 
audit assurance and decrease the well-
offness of consumers. (Of course the 
possibility exists of noncompliance with 
required ineffective standards as an alter-
native to providing lower overall audit 
assurance. However, any deviation from 
GAAS could cause the auditor difficulty in 
demonstrating that he had performed an 
examination with due audit care.) 
Evidence suggests that price pressure 
does exist. Survey findings that 93 percent of 
corporate respondents in the U.S. have an 
ongoing program to minimize or control the 
amount of audit fees support a real concern 
by auditees over the costs of auditing 
services, 2 and consequently substantial 
pressure by auditees to reduce audit fees. 
While the price pressure does not necessarily 
result from the subsidization of ineffective 
inputs via GAAS, the mere existence of such 
pressures implies that increased costs cannot 
be easily passed on to consumers. 
If GAAS merely reinforces existing prac-
tice and requires that an essential effective 
procedure be performed, the regulation 
would be more analogous to a tax subsidy by 
government. Given that a procedure is 
already performed, a legal requirement for its 
performance would tend to make the demand 
for it inelastic and could yield increased 
output. Further, an effective procedure, 
applied more frequently, can lead to lower 
prices.3 (The lowered prices would reflect the 
lower cost from imposing effective audit 
procedures on otherwise inefficient auditors.) 
The critical determinant of whether GAAS 
that prescribe specific auditing techniques 
decrease or increase the total demand for 
audits depends on the wisdom of the 
regulators in their selection of auditing 
techniques to mandate. 
C. Rationing Effect 
Explicit rationing has been observed in 
government actions which officially dis-
courage the provision of certain services. For 
example, until 1973 SEC companies were not 
permitted to provide forecasts. In fact, the 
SEC has with few exceptions suppressed 
projections, values, and other soft informa-
tion. This attitude has only changed recently 
with the SEC's encouragement, and 
sometimes requirement, of forward-looking 
information on replacement accounting, 
forecasts, reserve accounting, and price-level 
adjustments. 
The SEC has had a preoccupation with 
insider trading, and inequitable information 
dissemination has led to enactment of the 
"theology of jumping the gun." By actively 
restricting the early dissemination of informa-
tion (sometimes called market conditioning), 
the SEC has, in effect, ignored the reality of 
outside information and the temporal advan-
tage of early dissemination (viz., earlier 
reallocation of resources). In addition, if such 
suppression motivates outsiders to produce 
information that they would otherwise not 
produce (since they produce it less efficient-
ly), the regulatory action induces avoidable 
information-production costs. 
The restriction of certain types of informa-
tion does not have to be explicit to generate a 
rationing effect. If liability exposure is sub-
stantial (as is the case for professional parties 
to security transactions under the securities 
acts), production of certain information by 
the most efficient producers may be 
deterred.4 
D. Auditing Standards 
Specific auditing standards can have 
effects upon demand, costs, and supply of 
auditing services. Analogies drawn between 
accounting/auditing standard-setting and 
more general classes of regulation describe a 
framework for analyzing the effects of a 
particular standard. However, a more global 
approach to assessing the effects of standard-
setting addresses the decision process of any 
private or public regulatory body. Rule by 
committee or board decisions necessarily 
depends on the wisdom of the selected rule-
makers. A mandated disclosure system, as 
well as a mandated audit process, runs into 
complicated problems of relevance and 
choice stemming from the variety of auditees 
and the different backgrounds and "needs" of 
the users. These problems are likely to result 
in the setting of some ineffective standards 
that either do not fulfill the desired objectives 
or do so in an inefficient manner. How many 
ineffective standards result will depend on the 
extent to which those setting standards have 
full information. Not only must standard-
setters evaluate auditing techniques, but they 
must also try to balance users' needs. The 
balance reached is unlikely to compare 
favorably to the balance that could be 
reached in the market. 
The mandating of audit standards is 
equivalent to suppressing access to the 
market and free negotiation of prices. The 
result is a rise in costs and a reduction in the 
extent of mutually preferred exchanges 
among contracting parties. For example, if 
principals and managers of a small firm are 
not interested in disclosures concerning 
pensions, leases, contingencies, and related 
parties, yet want an unqualified or "clean" 
audit report, they cannot contract for such a 
service. The "one GAAP for all" approach of 
standard-setting, enforced by auditors, 
precludes such contracting and appears 
particularly burdensome for the smaller 
companies.5 Although a social contract with 
report users exists, in addition to a technical 
contract between specific parties, it is doubt-
ful that information found to be largely 
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irrelevant or not cost-beneficial by contract-
ing parties would be useful to some uniden-
tified third party if costs are appropriately 
considered. 
The extent to which access to the market 
is suppressed is largely a function of the 
detail of standard-setting. A characterization 
of accounting and auditing regulation differs 
along the specificity-generality continuum. 
Generality refers to standards that set a 
reasonable criterion on which to judge 
relevance. In contrast, specificity refers to 
rules which withdraw from the decision 
maker's consideration one or more of the 
circumstances that would be relevant to the 
decision according to a standard. The 
difference between a rule and a standard is a 
matter of degree-the degree of precision. 
Accounting guidelines tend to be fairly 
specific, detailed disclosure requirements, 
whereas auditing standards are general in the 
sense of stressing objectives instead of the 
means of reaching those objectives. While 
auditors enforce accounting regulations 
through the reporting of noncompliance, the 
implication to be drawn from a precision 
comparison of accounting and auditing 
standards is that the cost imposed on society 
by accounting regulation is greater than that 
imposed by auditing regulation. The larger 
cost results from allowing less flexibility in 
the extent to which mutually preferred 
exchanges are permitted between auditor and 
auditee regarding reporting and accounting 
methods relative to auditing processes. The 
requirement of "one GAAP for all" is more of 
an accounting regulatory constraint than an 
auditing constraint, although it affects the 
content of the auditor's report. Since rules are 
easier and cheaper to enforce than stan-
dards,6 the question arises as to why 
regulators and the profession have 
systematically differed in their treatment of 
accounting and auditing standard-setting. 
One argument is that accounting 
statements are frequently compared for 
investment decisions whereas audit 
processes are not, implying some value to 
detailed uniformity. A second argument is 
that the nature of the audit, specifically the 
requirement that the audit be tailored to the 
client's characteristics, precludes specifying 
detailed audit procedures. If this is so, why do 
some specific procedures like inventory 
observation and accounts receivable confir-
mation become a part of the standards? The 
well-known answer to these examples is 
litigation. The profession mandated these 
procedures based on the McKesson & Rob-
bins court case, which charged that CPAs 
had done inadequate audit work by not 
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performing these particular audit techniques. 
The standards have been hypothesized to be 
a means for the auditing profession to 
establish a legal defense of "due care." Yet 
the substantial generality in standards causes 
one to question this hypothesis. Regardless 
of the degree to which a motivation for 
detailed standards for legal defense exist, the 
costs of prescribing detailed audit techniques 
and the extent to which the techniques are to 
be applied apparently outweigh, in the view of 
the private standard-setting board, the 
benefits of extensive specificity. However, 
individual firms do set detailed auditing 
"standards" (rules) which are likely to be an 
important feature of legal regulation. Such 
rules represent the generally accepted prac-
tice of the profession, a measure of due care. 
The question remains: why don't the 
private and public regulators set detailed 
standards? According to the insurance 
hypothesis, the use of standards, as opposed 
to rules, bears benefits to both private and 
government regulators. Generality permits 
the government to claim the inadequacy of 
auditing procedures in the wake of trouble, 
and the standard-setting boards can likewise 
avoid blame, since the litigation claim rests 
on the auditor's judgment within the pre-
scribed standards. Materiality, a concept infa-
mous for its vagueness, has been cited in the 
literature as a very effective shield used by 
the SEC against criticism. In fact, the SEC 
has even argued that any detailed guideline 
for regulation "would be a blueprint for 
fraud." The strength of such an insurance 
motivator for ambiguity in regulations will 
rest on whether regulators are active in 
promoting their self-interestor the public 
interest. 
E. Regulators: Self-Interest 
Maximizers? 
Recently, there have been challenges to 
the argument that government represents the 
public interest.7 While politicians have always 
assumed other individuals act in their own 
self-interest, they have claimed that they are 
different and that, as regulators, they act in 
the public interest. However, the behavior of 
politicians and regulators is not well ex-
plained if a researcher assumes that the 
regulator acts in the public interest. In fact, 
recent analyses of the political process which 
assume politicians maximize their own utility 
have demonstrated an ability to explain 
observed behavior.8 Obviously, the maximiza-
tion of one's own utility does not preclude 
actions in the public interest. However, 
conflicts between the public interest and self-
interest are likely to arise. The inability of 
public-interest rationales to explain some 
regulatory behavior suggests that the 
hypothesis of utility maximization is more 
consistent with available evidence than is the 
hypothesis of public interest maximization.9 
F. "Free-Riders": A Tax Effect 
The acknowledgment that politicians are 
self-interest maximizers suggests a free-rider 
nature of regulation. The free-rider problem, 
as discussed in an earlier section, refers to 
the fact that some individuals who have not 
paid for a commodity cannot be excluded 
from its use. The commodity most likely has 
some public good attributes, i.e., use by one 
party does not diminish use by another party. 
The literature has discussed the free-rider 
incentives of financial analysts.10 However, 
the analysts are not the only potential free-
riders who request information that might not 
be produced if subjected to a "public interest" 
cost-benefit evaluation. Information useful to 
government in performing its responsibilities, 
e.g., enforcing anti-trust legislation and 
monitoring compliance with varied agencies' 
prescriptions, can be obtained through dis-
closure regulation with payment imposed on 
the current and future stockholders of public 
corporations. These costs, in part, may be 
passed on to consumers (depending on the 
elasticity of demand for the corporations' 
products). Some regulations essentially con-
script CPAs for government enforcement 
activities. With the ability to subsidize govern-
ment operations by shifting enforcement 
responsibilities to CPAs, regulators can 
maximize their utility, including their leisure 
time and their performance measures, in-
curring few direct costs, simply by regulating 
auditors. At the same time, the regulators can 
justify the expansion of the budget and the 
power of the SEC by passing numerous 
guidelines and by reprimanding those CPA 
firms that are blamed for the financial 
troubles of auditees or shareholders. While 
such action would clearly be justified on a 
cost-benefit basis from the self-interest 
perspective of legislators, this criterion is 
unlikely to match the "public interest" 
criterion claimed when implementing 
regulations. Any divergence of "public in-
terest" and "regulators' self-interest" has the 
effect of a tax. As always, taxes transfer 
wealth from both consumers and producers 
to government. The tax is hidden in the sense 
that companies don't pay the government 
directly but instead incur information and 
auditing costs that reflect the public interest 
and the regulators' interest. In addition, there 
is an efficiency loss due to a reduction in the 
volume of trade, analogous to any tax effect. 
If the insurance hypothesis holds, the 
numerous regulations that expand the scope 
of auditors' responsibilities and impose costs 
of implementation will correspond to the 
expansion of regulators' perceived respon-
sibilities. If price pressure again precludes a 
simple addition of the requirements to 
existing audit procedures (i.e., demand is not 
perfectly inelastic and the auditor is unwilling 
to perform the additional procedure at the 
same price), the diverting of auditors' atten-
tion away from the financial statement 
information can result in less output (either a 
lower assurance level or fewer audits). The 
output related to the expanded scope com-
bined with less of the output available prior to 
the additional regulation, could be of greater 
net value, but this outcome would imply a 
cost-benefit justification process in 
regulation-setting, with an emphasis on the 
public interest. The self-interest evidence is 
increasing, and evidence of careful cost-
benefit assessments by regulators is lacking. 
Not only is the SEC capable of avoiding 
blame and shifting enforcement responsibility 
(through the use of private boards as the 
principal standard-setters}, but it is also able 
to avoid explicit cost-benefit assessment 
responsibilities through reliance on the 
private sector. For example, if the SEC had 
called for segmental financial reporting 
instead of pressuring the Financial Account-
ing Standards Board (FASB) to require such 
reports, it would have been obliged to 
evaluate alternative reporting schemes, draft 
a specific proposal, and then invite comments 
on the draft. Yet, even the draft comment 
process does not guarantee an objective 
cost-benefit analysis, since the SEC has been 
known to pay limited attention to strong 
opposition in comment letters received, 
dismissing them as coming from interested 
parties. A recent example of problems with 
the cost-benefit evaluation procedures of the 
SEC is provided by the SEC proposal to 
require reports on internal accounting con-
trol. The initial proposal's time frame was 
unrealistic as indicated by the decision to 
table the 1979 reporting requirements. An 
overwhelming, negative response to the 
proposal (over 950 letters) and the specific 
criticisms voiced further suggest that there 
was inadequate investigation of relevant 
issues during the proposal formulation stage. 
Finally, despite a three-year waiting period 
before further action in this area, the SEC has 
made it clear that if the private sector does 
not act, the Commission will. The SEC's 
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statement of the need for internal accounting 
control reports in spite of preparers', users', 
and auditors' negative comments on the 
proposal suggests only limited attention has 
been paid to public comments. 11 
The free-rider attributes of information12 
provide one explanation for the expanding 
scope of regulation. In light of the free-rider 
potential for regulators, the freedom of such 
regulatory bodies as the SEC to prescribe 
accounting and auditing regulations could be 
costly. If the regulators' role was restricted to 
enforcement rather than standard-setting and 
enforcement, the costs related to regulators' 
activities as free-riders could be expected to 
be lower. 
G. Publicity and Attention 
The insurance incentive of government to 
require audits has already been addressed, as 
has the incentive to subsidize government 
operations. In addition to these incentives, 
publicity and attention are important factors 
that motivate legislators to set regulations. 13 
Typically, crusades on moralistic issues like 
questionable payments and perks have 
prevailed. For example, the publicity 
surrounding post-Watergate revelations of 
questionable or illegal payments apparently 
precipitated (or at least provided a rationale 
for) the attention paid by Senator Metcalf and 
Representative Moss to the accounting 
profession.14 The auditing standard regard-
ing illegal payments, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), and the SEC's pro-
posed reporting on internal control all 
appear to relate to the attention opportunity 
provided by the illegal payments issue. 15 The 
propriety of claiming that the FCPA was a 
reaction to a moral cause rather than a cost-
benefit based decision can be assessed by 
reviewing subsequent analysis of the Act's 
effects. The costs of the FCPA have been 
estimated by a White House task force 
assigned to study the effects of the 1977 law 
to include a $1 billion a year loss from U.S. 
trade abroad. The offsetting benefits of the 
Act remain unclear,16 but there is empirical 
evidence that the illegal payments had no 
statistically significant effect on investorsY 
H. Old laws Never Die? 
The benefits of each auditing regulation 
require individual study to ascertain whether 
the requirement is in the "public interest." 
In contrast, at least one attribute of regulation 
imposes costs which are evident in all sectors 
of the political process and can be particular-
ly costly to the auditing production function 
in light of the dynamic nature of business and 
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the technological innovations in auditing. 18 
Unlike private companies, regulators do 
not benefit from resources saved when 
unnecessary regulations are removed. 
Regulators appear to be conservative in the 
sense that old regulations frequently continue 
even when they appear to be no longer 
useful. The rigidity of the auditing production 
function (implied by regulation of inputs) will 
decrease the auditor's flexibility in adapting 
to new technology and to shifts in the relative 
costs of inputs. An even more acute problem 
could exist in the accounting rule-setting 
process due to the specificity of rulings. As 
old standards are retained and new ones 
added, the prospect and possibility of actual 
enforcement and enforceability will tend to 
decline, given constraints on regulators' 
budgets. This will lead to selective enforce-
ment of the law, i.e., discriminatory enforce-
ment by those in power, which results in 
wealth transfers away from the selected 
violators of the law. Those selected cannot 
afford to persist in a disagreement with the 
Commission due to the high costs of delay 
and of the adverse publicity surrounding a 
new stock or bond issue; hence, the costs to 
selected violators are likely to be substantial. 
The magnitude of the cost of a regulator's 
incentive structure that does not reward for 
removing regulations is an empirical ques-
tion. Although the SEC lifted its requirement 
for replacement cost accounting when price 
level reporting requirements were set by the 
private sector, contrary examples of redun-
dant and/or conflicting rules, such as the 
reported problems of codifying the securities 
regulations, exist. Regardless of the costs 
involved, the incentive structure of regulators 
has a theoretical flaw relative to the private 
sector. (Note that this analysis assumes that 
no unidentified benefits exist that equal or 
exceed such costs.) 
I. A Means of Forestalling Regulation 
As already discussed, regulation tends to 
increase the demand for audits as a vehicle to 
subsidize government operations, to qualify 
for "going public," and to expand the 
customer base. However, another potential 
effect of existing SEC requirements is the 
encouragement of voluntary audits in the 
unregulated sector as a means of forestalling 
regulation and quieting the press. This is a 
competing explanation of widespread volun-
tary audits in the municipal sector. Similarly, 
the privately formed auditing and accounting 
standards are frequently described as means 
of deterring SEC regulation. The conclusion 
to be drawn-and a very important conclu-
sian for one undertaking an analysis of the 
economics of the audit function-is that it is 
difficult to extract the effects of regulation 
from the effects of the free market. However, 
the historical evidence of pre-regulation 
audits cannot be attributed to the auditee's 
desire to forestall regulation, despite the 
potential explanation of audits observed in 
the non-SEC sector since 1934. 
J. Synopsis 
The benefits of regulation are claimed to 
center on improved resource allocation 
issues. For example, the literature is full of 
claims that regulation restricts the oppor-
tunities to exploit inside information, reduces 
unnecessary duplication of efforts, resolves 
the free-rider problem that is not resolved by 
the market due to difficulties in enforcing the 
rule of excluding nonpurchasers, and 
resolves issues concerning the discriminatory 
terms of trade in the market for information 
due to differential costs of or opportunities 
for information production (e.g., the firm's 
monopoly position over information about 
itself). However, these claims are not 
necessarily met through existing regulation, 
nor is regulation the sole means of ad-
dressing resource allocation issues. In fact, 
since regulation requires a mechanism for 
making optimal (or at least better) informa-
tion production decisions, which are in turn 
imposed on firms, and for efficiently dis-
seminating the produced information-non-
trivial tasks-regulation may not be the 
preferred arrangement. 
By permitting the free market to operate-
with voluntary trading and an assessment of 
the costs of disclosures and auditing 
procedures in light of the monitoring, infor-
mation, and insurance benefits derived-the 
amount of audit services supplied in the 
unregulated economy could result in an 
optimal allocation of resources. In addition, 
the normal operations of a free market system 
can be expected to enforce contracts on a 
more uniform basis than government 
regulators enforce their policies, given 
budget limitations. 
In this "look at regulation" the costs of 
regulation have been focused upon along 
with the incentives of regulators in order to 
understand the specific effects of regulation 
on the audit product. The choice between a 
market or a regulatory mechanism for resolv-
ing identified problems in reaching the 
optimal level of information production is a 
continuing decision process as each issue is 
considered by the political sector. It is hoped 
this instrument will allow you to critically 
evaluate arguments both for and against 
proposed regulation. 
Questions for Discussion 
1. Explain how regulations over accounting 
and auditing services are analogous to 
government programs which impose a 
price floor, ration output, or assess taxes. 
What other similarities exist between 
accounting and auditing regulation and 
other government activities? 
2. Who are the potential free-riders of man-
dated audits? 
3. Compare and contrast accounting regula-
tion with auditing regulation. Suggest a 
possible explanation for a difference in the 
regulation of accounting and auditing. 
4. Discuss the plausibility of the claim that 
government regulation of accounting and 
auditing is required due to the "market 
failures" that arise from public good 
attributes of information, redundant 
production of information, and managers' 
"monopoly" over information. (Refer to 
Sections IV and VII in formulating your 
responses.) 
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X. 
Summary 
Economic incentives exist for parties to 
have and to supply an audit. The auditing 
process makes the terms of a contract 
sufficiently observable to facilitate specializa-
tion by agents, diversification of principals' 
resources, and increased productivity. The 
audit fulfills three explicit demands: a de-
mand for a monitoring mechanism, a demand 
for information production to improve in-
vestors' decisions, and a demand for in-
surance to protect against losses from 
distorted information. Joint products of the 
audit include cost savings in operations 
stemming from suggestions by the auditor for 
improved operating efficiency, lower costs 
from property and bonding insurance, re-
duced loss from errors, lower costs for 
complementary services, and regulatory com-
pliance. In explaining, marketing, and 
deciding to contract for an audit, these 
insights will provide an analytical basis for 
describing and evaluating those attributes of 
the product which are relevant to the decision 
process. The supply of auditing reflects those 
attributes of auditing which are valued by 
consumers, including the "observability" of 
audit quality. Examples of supply responses 
to demand in the free market include: 
1. professional certification, 
2. professional liability responsibilities, 
3. the tailoring of the audit to the auditee's 
system, 
4. the trade-offs available to auditees 
through limited substitution of im-
proved controls for external audit fees, 
5. the provision of complementary ser-
vices, and 
6. the collection and documentation of 
quantitative evidence that a sufficient 
amount of auditing was performed to 
provide the basis for forming an opinion 
on the fairness of financial statements. 
Political and regulatory issues related to 
the audit frequently stem from claims that 
market failures have occurred due to the 
public good nature of information and the 
monopolistic position of the firm in the 
production of information about its own 
performance. Market incentives to produce 
public information have been outlined. The 
costs of regulation have been described, with 
recognition that politicians' activities may not 
necessarily be in the public interest. 
Presumably you are now aware of the 
controversy which surrounds the production 
of accounting and auditing information and 
understand the role of the audit in the 
regulated environment. The mandated audit 
not only serves as a regulatory tool to 
disseminate public information, which was 
similarly disseminated in the unregulated 
market, but also provides insurance to 
regulators that information useful to govern-
ment in performing its responsibilities is 
automatically provided. 
Empirical questions concerning whether 
regulation has increased the demand for 
auditing services persist due to the obvious 
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concurrent increases in the cost of the 
auditing process that have resulted from 
regulation. Claims that auditing is prevalent 
due to regulation are inconsistent with the 
existence of audits prior to regulation. 
However, the possibility exists that the 
government's intervention in formulating 
accounting and auditing standards and in 
expanding liability responsibilities has 
decreased the total demand for audits. 
Regulations may have made the current 
production process economically unfeasible 
for smaller, unregulated entities which do not 
face the inelastic demand curve imposed by 
regulation. The recent professional standard 
which permits "compilation and review ser-
vices" (financial statement preparation and 
limited review) by CPAs may well evidence a 
demand by this unregulated sector for some 
professional services by the CPA as a limited 
substitute for the high priced audits that 
necessarily reflect production costs imposed 
by regulators. The analysis of the demand for 
compilation and review services is just one 
example of how an understanding of the audit 
product and its roles in the free market and 
the regulated environment permits the 
analysis of current events that affect 
professional practice. 
An important facet of your study of 
auditing is to understand the product in its 
current environment. With this theoretical 
framework for viewing the audit function you 
will now explore the details of the audit 
production function which necessarily reflect 
actions by the private standard-setting 
boards, regulators, and the courts as they 
have defined the duties and responsibilities of 
the auditor. Critically evaluate the degree to 
which existing guidelines contribute to the 
various outputs of the auditing process by 
applying the framework described herein. 
This approach to learning the details of 
auditing will insure an in-depth understand-
ing of the audit product and the underlying 
process of supplying that product. 
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